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INTRODUCTION

Although the Supreme Court has declared that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"' the
Court's decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council' effected a dramatic reallocation in authority between the
branches,3 shifting significant power from the judicial branch and handing it
over to administrative agencies.' The Court's recent decision in National
Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services
marks yet another striking continuation in that shift.5 In Brand X, the Court
made clear that when a court independently construes an ambiguous provision in an agency-administered statute, the judicial construction is "not authoritative."6 Rather, the agency remains free to subsequently adopt a
contrary Chevron-eligible interpretation and to thereby trump a court's independent declaration of the best reading of the statute. 7 The new rule embraced in Brand X, accordingly, tells courts that even after they go through
the exercise of independently declaring "what the law is,"' a Chevroneligible agency will remain free to override the judiciary's own independent
I Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 189 (2006) (arguing that Chevron
went "so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury");see also Richard W. Murphy, A "New" CounterMarbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56 ADMIN. L REV. 1, 37
(2004) (noting the "tension between the Marbury norm that [courts] control legal meaning and the
Chevron norm that agencies control policymaking, which in turn, sometimes controls legal meaning").
4 Voluminous scholarly commentary underscores the significance of Chevron. See, e.g., David J.
Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201 (2002); Elizabeth
Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2637 (2003); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot:
SeparatingInterpretationand Lawmaking under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. Am. U. 187 (1992); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing ReasonedDecisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEx. L. REV. 83 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law andAdministration After Chevron,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
5 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
6 Id. at 982-84 (emphasis added).
7 Only some agencies will benefit from BrandX's new rule because only some agencies are eligible
for Chevron deference. See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEo. L.J. 833, 848-49 & nn.83-84 (2001) (listing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
an example of an agency that consistently has been denied Chevron deference). In addition, some statutes, such as the Administrative Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act, do not fall within
Chevron's reach because they are not administered by a single agency but rather "apply to all or virtually all administrative agencies." Id. at 893.
8 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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declaration and to adopt a contrary construction so long as the judicial construction did not rest on the statute's clear text.9
Given that the Court just recently handed down Brand X, the full implications of the decision have yet to unfold." Courts and commentators
alike, however, already have begun to recognize that the case has the makings of a watershed decision." Consider, for example, how the Court's new
rule set forth in Brand X might play out in the following scenario. A suit
between two private parties turns on the meaning of an ambiguous term
found in a portion of the Communications Act: the term "at the same location."' 2 The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), which is not a
party to the case, has yet to interpret the meaning of this term, so the district
court goes ahead and declares its own independent view of the best reading
of the statute. After the Court of Appeals affirms the district court's construction, the FCC concludes that it disagrees with the judicial interpretation. Thanks to the new rule set forth in BrandX, the FCC need not adhere
to the judicial construction in the future. Rather, the FCC-seizing on
BrandX-may conduct a rulemaking proceeding and adopt a contrary construction, thereby erasing the prior judicial declaration of the best reading of
the statute."'

Justice Scalia-unhappy with the Court's new rule-wrote a biting
dissent in Brand X in which he attacked the majority for ignoring prior
precedent and for creating a "breathtaking" novelty: "judicial decisions
subject to reversal by Executive officers."' 4 Justice Scalia made clear that
he would not have objected to the Court's new rule if the rule were confined
to situations where an agency sought to erase a judicial decision based on
Chevron deference."

Given that Chevron operates under the assumption

9 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982-84. Where Congress has chosen not to delegate lawmaking powers to
an agency and the agency could not authoritatively interpret ambiguity in a statute pursuant to Chevron,
the judicial role in the interpretive process remains unaffected by Brand X. In those situations, because
Congress has chosen not to delegate legislative power to the relevant agency, the appropriate inference
is that Congress would want the courts to interpret the statute "as faithful agents of Congress" when adjudicating matters implicating statutory ambiguities. Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section
1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2173 (2004).
10 Administrative agencies are just beginning to recognize the import of BrandX and to rely on the
decision to promulgate regulations that run contrary to statutory interpretations issued by the courts.
See, e.g., Proposed Rules, Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Competitive
Acquisition for Certain Durable Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics and Supplies, 71 Fed. Reg.
25,654, 25,660 (May 1, 2006) (relying on Brand Xin support of proposed rule that would run counter to
the decisions of three district courts).
' See, e.g., AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442 (E.D, Pa. 2005) (noting that Brand X "dramatically altered the respective roles of courts and agencies under Chevron").
12 47 U.S.C. § 153(30) (2000); see also In re StarNet, Inc., 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting ambiguity in the term "location").
13 See BrandX,545 U.S. at 1015-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 1016-17.
15 Id. at 1017-18, n.12.
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that ambiguous terms can bear multiple meanings, a court applying Chevron does not purport to give statutory ambiguity its own independent judicial construction.
Instead, the court merely accepts the agency's
construction as one reasonable reading-leaving open the possibility that
the agency might subsequently adopt a different construction. 6 Justice
Scalia, however, correctly noted that the Court's new rule does not merely
allow an agency to erase judicial precedents that rest on Chevron deference.' 7 Rather, BrandX goes much further: it allows an agency to override
even independent judicial interpretations reached in the absence of Chevron
deference. It is in this respect that Justice Scalia decried the Court's new
rule as a bizarre and likely unconstitutional transfer of power from courts to
agencies."
Although Justice Scalia's dissent highlights the magnitude of the
Court's decision, none of the other justices joined Justice Scalia in rejecting
Brand X's new rule. 9 This Article, accordingly, accepts BrandXas a reality and proceeds to focus on how the courts might adapt to their newly reduced role in the interpretive process. Specifically, this Article focuses on
one prominent question raised by the Court's decision: now that federal
courts know that their independent constructions of regulatory statutes may
amount to nothing more than an "interim" or "provisional" construction that
the relevant agency can cast aside,2" should the courts seek to avoid issuing
16

1d. (noting that a judicial decision deferring to an agency's position under Chevron "does not

even 'purport to give the statute a judicial interpretation'); see also Rebecca Hanner White, The Stare
Decisis "Exception" to the Chevron Deference Rule, 44 FLA. L. REV. 723, 726 (1992) ("If the Court's
prior opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading of the statute, but not the only
one possible, and the agency thereafter adopts a different interpretation, the new reading is entitled to
deference under Chevron, free from the constraints of stare decisis."); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7,
at 916 (arguing that if a court upholds an agency interpretation under Chevron as a reasonable statutory
construction, the court's acceptance of the agency's interpretation does not "foreclose the possibility that
a different agency interpretation would also be reasonable").
17 BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1017-18, n.12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 1017.
19 Justice Scalia is the only Justice who took the view that an agency should
not be able to trump
any judicial interpretations. Two other Justices (Souter and Ginsburg) did not express an opinion on the
stare decisis issue; they joined only the portion of Justice Scalia's dissent that argued that the FCC's interpretation was implausible. Id. at 1005. In contrast, one Justice (Stevens) took the view that agencies
should be able to trump lower court interpretations but not necessarily Supreme Court interpretations.
Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., concurring). The remaining five members of the Brand X Court-Justices
Thomas, Kennedy, O'Connor, Rehnquist and Breyer-all seem to support applying the Court's new rule
to all judicial interpretations, including Supreme Court precedent.
20 In using the term "provisional," I borrow from Kenneth A. Bamberger, who argued prior to
Brand X that "a court's choice of one reasonable construction of regulatory statutes" should be viewed
as merely "provisional"-leaving the relevant agency free to adopt a contrary construction. Kenneth A.
Bamberger, ProvisionalPrecedent: ProtectingFlexibility in Administrative Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1272, 1307-11 (2002). Although the Supreme Court did not cite Bamberger's article in Brand X,
the Court essentially adopted Bamberger's framework for "provisional" precedent in the administrative
realm.
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their own independent judicial interpretations in the absence of the relevant
agency's views in the first place?
Finding an answer to this question gains significance when one considers that Congress often chooses to give both federal courts and agencies
roles in interpreting the very same statutory provisions. Many regulatory
statutes-ranging from federal telecommunications laws to securities
laws-empower an agency to set policy and to resolve legal questions in
the context of agency enforcement and rulemaking efforts, but also simultaneously empower the courts to resolve legal issues while adjudicating private rights of action brought pursuant to agency-administered statutes."
Because the relevant agency is not a party when one private party pursues a
private right of action in federal court against another private party, courts
may not have the benefit of the relevant agency's views prior to construing
ambiguity in the context of private litigation.22 In such situations, should
courts continue to blow full steam ahead and blindly issue their own independent but non-authoritative statutory constructions, or should courts in
the wake of Brand X explore ways that they might avoid issuing independent constructions in the absence of the authoritative agency's views?
To answer this question, this Article looks to the federalism context
and draws on the federal courts' experience adapting to the Court's landmark decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins.23 Much like Brand
X, the Court's Erie decision, which commanded federal courts to apply state
law in all cases not governed by positive federal law,24 significantly reduced
the lawmaking power of the federal courts by putting the federal courts in
the position of interpreting law that they cannot definitively construe. Although Erie seemed simple enough to adhere to when state law provided a
clear answer, Erie posed a serious dilemma when federal courts faced the
task of applying ambiguous state law that they could not authoritatively

21 See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 18.5 (4th ed. 2002).
22 Consider, for example, the federal securities laws. Private securities litigation filed in federal dis-

trict courts by private parties "plays an essential role in federal securities regulation." David S. Ruder,
The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L.
REv. 1167, 1168. An important portion of private securities suits raises unresolved issues of law-the
resolution of which often will affect the Securities and Exchange Commission's own enforcement and
rulemaking efforts under the securities laws. Id. The courts, accordingly, frequently face "new and difficult legal questions" in the context of securities litigation between private litigants-questions that
have yet to be resolved by the Commission. Giovanni P. Prezioso, General Counsel, Sec. and Exch.
Comm'n, Remarks Before the American Bar Association Section of Business Law, General Counsel
Forum, (June 3, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch060304gpp.htm.
23 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24 See id. at 78. ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State."). Erie, in other words, declared that there is no
such thing as "federal general common law." Id. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARV. L. REv. 881, 890 (1986) (discussing the meaning and scope
of "federal common law").
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construe.2 5 To try to resolve this dilemma, various mechanisms, including

abstention and state certification procedures, emerged to enable federal
courts to seek out a state's views on an unresolved issue of law before ruling on the issue.26 The federal courts and state courts, in other words,
sought to cooperate and to interact with each other rather than simply passing like ships in the night.
That the federal courts adapted to their reduced lawmaking role in the
federalism context by seeking to cooperate and interact with state courts
suggests that the federal courts similarly could adapt to their newly reduced
interpretive role in the administrative realm post-BrandX. This Article argues that courts should become increasingly willing to utilize an "interactive" interpretive approach when independently resolving statutory
ambiguity that, although delegated to a Chevron-eligible agency, has yet to
be interpreted by the agency in a format commanding Chevron deference.27
Pursuant to such an approach, courts should become increasingly willing to
solicit agency views before issuing independent judicial interpretations of
statutory ambiguities, and courts should be required to give due consideration to relevant agency views even if the views do not control the courts. 8
By soliciting agency views and giving appropriate consideration to agency
interpretation of statutory ambiguities, courts will minimize the frequency
of interbranch confrontations and further efficiency and uniformity in the
law. In addition, increased interaction between courts and agencies will enable the courts to capitalize on agency expertise and to minimize judicial
policymaking.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I describes the two polar models the courts currently use when allocating interpretive power: Chevron's
"deferential" model, which hands interpretive power over to the relevant
25 See Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism andJudicialFederalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1459, 1461, 1466 (1997); Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman,
Interactive Judicial Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373, 376

(2000).
26 See infra Part iII.A.

27 This might occur in a variety of circumstances. A court, for example, might need to reach an independent construction of a statutory ambiguity--even though Congress delegated interpretive powers
to an agency-because the agency has yet to construe the ambiguous statutory terms in any form what-

soever. See AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000). Or a court may be
forced to render an independent statutory construction because the agency has interpreted the ambiguity
only in an informal format that lacks "the force of law" and thus does not bind the courts pursuant to
Chevron. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 829 (10th Cir. 2000).
28 My proposal does not make interaction between courts and agencies mandatory but rather leaves
both sides-courts and agencies-with the discretion to decide whether to engage in interaction in a
given case. I view such a discretionary approach as preferable to a mandatory approach for two primary
reasons. First, giving courts and agencies the power to decide within their discretion when interaction
would be appropriate ensures that the benefits and costs of interaction can be weighed on a case-by-case
basis. Second, mandatingthat courts seek out the views of agencies in pending cases might well meddle
with the judicial process.
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agency, and the "independent judgment" model, 29 which leaves statutory interpretation in the hands of the courts. Part II describes the state of the law
prior to BrandX in terms of the relationship between these two competing
models and principles of stare decisis. Part II then explains how Brand X
broke away from prior Supreme Court precedent by-for the first time
ever-expressly sanctioning the notion that a Chevron-eligible agency can
overrule a court's own independent declaration of what the law means.
In light of BrandX's new rule-that courts have the power to say what
the law means only until an agency adopts a contrary construction-Part III
calls for courts to draw on the lessons of the federalism model and argues
for an "interactive" approach to statutory interpretation.3" Part III argues
that such an approach would be normatively satisfying because it would
further notions of efficiency and uniformity, allow courts to draw on the
comparative expertise of the relevant agency, and enable courts to minimize
judicial policymaking.
Part IV proposes two concrete suggestions for how courts could move
toward an interactive approach. First, drawing on an analogy to abstention
and state certification procedures used in the federalism context, Part IV
proposes that courts become increasingly willing to invite and consider
agency views rather than blindly issuing a judicial construction of a statute
that the agency has yet to construe. 3 The primary jurisdiction doctrine,
which allows courts to refer a matter back to the agency for its initial determination, could serve as one potential mechanism for soliciting agency
views. The ability of the lower federal courts to invite agencies to file
amicus curiae briefs, however, provides an even more promising mechanism for soliciting agency views.
Second, Part IV also proposes that once courts solicit agency views by
invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine or inviting agency amicus briefs,
the courts then must give due consideration to the agency's views, even if
they are set forth in a non-binding format that does not command Chevron
deference.32 Specifically, I propose that Skidmore v. Swifit-a recently revived 1944 Supreme Court decision-be conceptualized in a way that
would require the courts to take any non-binding agency views into account
29

In using this term, I follow prior scholars' terminology. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Inter-

pretationand the Balanceof Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 453-54 (1989);
Gregg D. Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court, 84 BOSTON U. L. REv. 185, 191-99

(2004).
30 This Article in no way questions the continuing validity of courts engaging in independent (and
non-interactive) statutory construction where statutory circumstances indicate no congressional intent to
delegate legislative power to an agency and where the agency therefore lacks the ability to obtain Chevron deference. In those situations, because Congress has chosen not to delegate legislative power to an
agency, the courts should continue to independently interpret any ambiguity in the statutes as faithful
agents of Congress. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
31 See infra Part IV.A.
32 See infra Part IV.B.
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as a relevant but not necessarily controlling data point when reaching their
own judicial constructions of statutes.33 In other words, the courts should
not be free to ignore an authoritative agency's views, even if the views do
not bind the courts pursuant to Chevron.
Finally, Part V considers potential objections to the interactive model
proposed here. Objections addressed in Part V include: whether it is
proper to fashion interpretive rules in order to minimize friction between
the branches; whether the interactive approach would minimize agency incentives to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking; whether an interactive approach would muddle the law of deference; and whether the
interactive approach would represent an abdication of the courts' role in the
interpretive process by cutting courts out of the interpretive process and actually minimizing interaction between courts and agencies. This article
concludes that these objections are not fatal and that it would be worthwhile
to encourage courts and agencies to interact with each other in the wake of
BrandX.
I.

ALLOCATING INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY BETWEEN COURTS AND
AGENCIES: Two COMPETING MODELS

When faced with resolving ambiguity in an agency-administered stat-

ute, courts currently utilize an "either-or" framework: either the authority
to say what the law means rests with the agency and hence Chevron's "deferential" model applies, or the authority to say what the law means remains
with the courts and hence the courts follow an "independent" interpretive
approach.34 This Part describes these two competing models.
A. Chevron ' Mandatory Deference Model
At one side, Chevron operates as a mandatory deference doctrine that
allocates primary interpretive authority to the relevant agency rather than
the courts. When operating under Chevron's "deferential model," the
courts do not independently interpret ambiguous terms in an agencyadministered statute in an attempt to discern the statute's "best" reading.35
33 Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
34 See Farina, supra note 29, at 453-54 (contrasting the "independent judgment model" under which
"interpretive authority rests principally with the court" with the "deferential model," which requires
courts to "accept any reasonable construction offered by the agency"); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 971 (1992) (noting that "[t]he attitude of
courts toward administrative interpretations of statutes has ranged between" deference and independent
judgment models).
35 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) ("If a
statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency's construction is reasonable, Chevron requires a
federal court to accept the agency's construction of the statute, even if the agency's reading differs from
what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation."); see also Farina, supra note 29, at 454 (stating that when the deferential model is applied, the court "determines only whether the interpretation the
agency has chosen is a 'rational' reading, not whether it is the 'right' reading").
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Rather, the courts frame the inquiry in terms of whether the relevant agency
has selected a "reasonable" interpretation from various plausible readings.36
Assuming that the agency has selected a reasonable interpretation, Chevron
compels the courts to accept the agency's reading, even if the court would
declare a different meaning if left to its own devices.37
In Chevron itself, the Court explained the mandatory rule of deference
by referring to notions of congressional intent: "[If] Congress has explicitly
left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to
the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation."38
The Court, however, also relied upon principles of accountability, concluding that politically accountable agencies are better suited than courts to
choose between competing policies when filling statutory "gaps."39 In light
of these different explanations for deference in the Court's decision, scholars quickly began to debate Chevron's legal underpinnings. Some scholars
saw Chevron as resting on "quasi-separation of powers" principles, including notions of accountability, legislative supremacy, and competence,
whereas others read Chevron as resting on notions of Congress's delegatory
intent.4 °
The Court-most likely sensing the need to offer clarification regarding Chevron's legal underpinnings and its scope-recently handed down
two significant Chevron decisions: Christensen v. Harris County4 and
United States v. Mead Corp.42 In Christensen and Mead, the Court clarified
that Chevron does not apply every time Congress leaves a gap in an agencyadministered statute but rather applies only when two circumstances are
met. First, Congress must have given the relevant agency the power to act
with the "force of law"-meaning that Congress must have given the

36 See generally Farina, supra note 29, at 454 (noting that, pursuant to the deferential
model, the

court "must accept any reasonable construction offered by the agency, so long as the statutory language
or, possibly, the legislative history is not patently inconsistent"); Merrill, supra note 34, at 971 (noting
that when the "deference" mode applies, "[tihe task of the court is viewed not as discovering the best
interpretation, but rather as assuring that the executive view does not contradict the statute and otherwise
furthers legitimate objectives"); Polsky, supra note 29, at 210, n. 141 ("If Chevron deference applies, the
court will not independently interpret the term.").
37 See BrandX, 545 U.S. at 981; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467
U.S. 837, 843-44 & n.l 1(1984).
38 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
39 Id. at 865-66 ("In contrast [to judges who are not part of either political branch of the Government,] an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgments.").
40 See generally Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 863-867, 870-72.
41 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
42 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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agency the power to bind those outside the agency, including the courts.43
Second, the agency must have invoked its delegated authority in rendering
the interpretation at issue." By limiting Chevron to these circumstances,
the Court made clear that Chevron's scheme of mandatory deference applies only when Congress contemplates that the agency can take (and where
the agency has taken) administrative action with "the effect of law."45 Because "[i]t is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for relatively formal
administrative procedure,"46 Chevron will apply to the fruits of notice-andcomment rulemaking and formal adjudication but generally will not reach
more informal agency views, such as those expressed in policy statements,
agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.47
The Court's decision to limit Chevron's scope in this way is best understood as resting on Chevron's basis in congressional intent: Mead made
clear that Chevron deference hinges on congressional intent to delegate
primary interpretive authority to the agency.48 Deference under Chevron,
accordingly, is mandatory where an agency has been delegated the authority
to act with the force of law because "Congress has commanded it."'49 In
contrast, where Congress has not delegated lawmaking authority to an
agency, Congress has not commanded deference to the agency's interpretations of statutory ambiguities, and hence Chevron does not apply.
B.

The Independent Judgment Model

Whereas Chevron's deferential model applies when statutory circumstances indicate congressional intent to delegate the power to act with the
force of law and where the agency actually invokes delegated authority, the
competing model-the "independent judgment" model-applies when
Congress has not given an agency the power to act with the force of law or
43 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; see also Thomas W. Merrill
&
Kathryn Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The OriginalConvention, 116 HARv. L. REV. 467,
470, 479 (2002).
44 Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27; see also Merrill & Watts, supranote 43, at 479.
45 Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
46 Id.
47 See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 ("Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack
the force of law--do not warrant Chevron-style deference."). But see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212,
222 (2002) (suggesting that Chevron's applicability turns not on the use of formal procedures but rather
on a variety of factors, including "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to the administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question").
48 See Merrill & Watts, supra note 43, at 479; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 908
(2006) ("Chevron deference... is not accorded merely because the statute is ambiguous and an administrative official is involved. A rule must be promulgated pursuant to authority Congress has delegated
to the official.").
49 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 870-71.
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when the agency has failed to exercise its delegated powers. When the independent judgment model applies, the power to fill statutory ambiguities
remains with the courts rather than the relevant agency. Thus, when applying the independent judgment model, courts are not bound to accept agency
views, such as views expressed in policy statements or agency manuals, but
rather the courts remain free to select their own favored statutory reading
using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, including textual analysis,
legislative history, canons of construction, and policy considerations."
Even though the independent judgment model ultimately leaves the
courts free to select their own preferred statutory reading, Skidmore v.
Swift-a 1944 decision--does allow courts to factor non-binding agency
views into the interpretive mix." In Skidmore, the Supreme Court made
clear that even agency views that do not control the courts, such as views
expressed in an interpretive bulletin or an agency amicus brief, may "constitute[] a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."52 In deciding what type of weight
to accord to non-binding agency views, Skidmore tells courts to consider a
variety of factors, including the specialized competence of the agency, the
thoroughness of the agency's consideration, the validity of the agency's
reasoning, and "all those factors which give [the agency's views the] power
to persuade, if lacking power to control."53 Skidmore deference, accordingly, runs on a sliding scale ranging "from great respect on one end... to
near indifference at the other."54
Scholars have paid relatively little attention to Skidmore through the
years.5 Nor has the Supreme Court done much to clarify Skidmore's meaning--other than to make clear that agency interpretations that fail to qualify
for Chevron deference may nonetheless be given some weight pursuant to
Skidmore. 6 As a result, Skidmore's precise meaning currently rests in the
50 See Farina, supranote 29, at 453-54; Merrill, supra note 34, at 971; Scalia, supra note 4, at 515.
51 Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 227; Christensen, 529

U.S. at 587.
52 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at
140.
53 Id.
54 Mead, 533 U.S. at 228. See generally Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing
Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1129 (2001) ("What
Christensendoes not answer[] is what, exactly, Skidmore deference means, if it can be said to be 'deference' at all.").
55 See Rossi, supra note 54, at 1110 (noting that "[flew law review articles address the topic" and
that "although Skidmore has been around nearly forty years longer than Chevron, it is cited by courts
less than twenty percent as often").
56 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 237 ("Chevron left Skidmore intact and applicable where statutory circumstances indicate no intent to delegate general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such
authority was not invoked .... "); see also Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. Although the Supreme Court
affirmed Skidmore's continuing vitality in Christensen and Mead, not all of the Justices are on the same
page with respect to Skidmore. Justice Scalia, for example, would like to eradicate Skidmore from the
judicial vocabulary. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]otality-of-the-circumstances
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hands of lower federal court judges who utilize diverging approaches. 7
Regardless of which approach to Skidmore is taken, however, the ultimate
responsibility for selecting a preferred construction of the statutory ambiguity rests with the court. Skidmore, therefore, does not displace the independent judgment model. 8 Rather, it merely serves as a tool that courts can
use along with other traditional tools of statutory interpretation. 9
II.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STARE DECISIS AND THE
COMPETING MODELS

Two

Given that Chevron's "deferential" model allocates interpretive authority to agencies whereas the "independent judgment" model allocates interpretive authority to the courts, an interesting puzzle emerged in the wake of
Chevron: What happens when a court goes ahead and engages in independent statutory construction pursuant to the independent judgment model because the relevant agency-although it could have issued a Chevroneligible interpretation-has yet to do so?6 Should principles of stare deSkidmore deference is a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation."). In addition,
Justice Breyer appears to view Chevron as a special type of Skidmore deference. See Christensen, 529
U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (Breyer, J.).
57 See infra notes 252-56 and accompanying text; see also Rossi, supra note 54, at 1125-30 (describing various approaches to Skidmore that the Supreme Court took in its decision in Christensen);
Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do?, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1877 (2006) (describing differing approaches the lower federal courts have taken in
applying Skidmore since Mead); Eric R. Womack, Into the Third Era of Administrative Law: An EmpiricalStudy of the Supreme Court's Retreat from Chevron Principles in United States v. Mead, 107
DICK. L. REV. 289, 341 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court "has decided to leave a question fundamental to the functioning of the administrative state in the hands of lower court judges who may come to
hundreds of different decisions on a sliding scale of Skidmore deference").
58 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 407 F.3d 1207, 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating
that, even when according Skidmore deference, "this court has an independent responsibility to decide
the legal issue"); United Techs. Corp. v. United States, 315 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting
that the court engages in de novo review even when according agency interpretation deference pursuant
to its power to persuade).
59 See Molly A. Leckey & Stephanie A. Roy, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 946, 954
(2004) (noting that, when applying Skidmore, "the court will simply engage in a de novo review of the
statute through the use of traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and if by chance, the agency's interpretation matches the court's de novo interpretation, only then will the court grant Skidmore deference
to the agency's construction"); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 855 (explaining that where
Skidmore is applied, there is no agency interpretation that is binding on the courts but rather it is "ultimately up to the court" to decide whether to give the agency's non-binding interpretation any weight);
Polsky, supra note 29, at 197 (noting that, when the independent judgment model is utilized, "the court
will bear primary interpretive responsibility, and the weight given to the agency's view will depend
,upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade"'). But see Murphy, supra note 3, at 37 (arguing that Skidmore "judicial constructions are not fully 'independent' in the
first place").
60 If an agency does adopt a Chevron-eligible interpretation and a court accepts the agency's interpretation as a reasonable interpretation pursuant to Chevron, then stare decisis principles do not prevent
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cisis, which generally carry particular force in the statutory construction
arena,6 lock the judicial interpretation into place, thereby trumping Chevron deference?6 2 Or should the Chevron-eligible agency remain free to subsequently exercise its lawmaking powers and to trump the stare decisis
effect of the prior judicial interpretation?
A. The Maislin, Lechmere and Neal Trio
In a trio of cases decided in the 1990s, the Supreme Court appeared to
resolve the conflict between Chevron and stare decisis in favor of stare decisis by steadfastly adhering to the view that independent judicial constructions of statutes trump an agency's contrary views. In the first case in the
trio, Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. PrimarySteel, Inc., the Court reviewed
the validity of a recently adopted Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") policy.63 The Court concluded that the ICC's new policy could not

stand because it contravened numerous precedents issued by the Court.64 In
explaining why its previous judicial precedents prevailed, the Court declared: "Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we adhere to
that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an
agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of
the statute's meaning."" Although the Court did not spell out exactly what
it meant by the term "clear," the statutory precedents enforced in Maislin
rested on the Court's own understanding of the policies underlying the Act,
not on some clear text included in the Act.66 Thus, when properly read,
the agency from later changing its reading of the statute. The reason for this is straightforward: where a
court merely accepts an agency's Chevron-eligible views as one of multiple reasonable readings of a
statute, the Court does not declare that the statute can only mean one thing. Thus, if a court accepts an
agency's interpretation pursuant to Chevron and the agency subsequently changes its mind, the court's
prior decision can give way to the new agency interpretation without violating notions of stare decisis
because no "independent" judicial construction fixing the statute's meaning would have to be cast aside.
See, e.g., Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1017, n.12 (2005)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Merrill & Hickman, supranote 7, at 916; White, supra note 16, at 726.
61 See IPB, Inc. v. Alvarez, 126 S.Ct. 514, 523 (2005); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989). One reason why considerations of stare decisis carry such significant
weight in statutory matters is because Congress always remains free to alter the statute and to thereby
change a court's interpretation. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); Patterson, 491
U.S. at 172-73. In other words, "judicial restraint strongly counsels waiting for Congress" to take the
initiative in changing statutory rules. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 112 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In addition, concerns about protecting reliance interests, reducing variations among decision makers,
and protecting the judiciary's institutional reputation also underpin the principle of stare decisis. See
Richard J. Pierce, Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2237 (1997).
62 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 61, at 2227 (suggesting methods of integrating Chevron and stare decisis); White, supra note 16, at 746-55 (considering whether Chevron should displace staredecisis).
63 497 U.S. 116 (1990).
64 Id. at 130.
65 Id. at 131 (emphasis added).
66 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 918 (arguing that the precedent enforced in Maislin did
not rest on the clear meaning of the statute or on a prior agency construction of the statute but rather rep-
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Maislin supports the proposition that once the Court fixes a statute's meaning, the statute's meaning becomes "clear" and hence agencies must abide
by that judicial reading. 7
Next in the trio came Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB.68 In that case, the Court
faced the task of reconciling the National Labor Relations Board's
("NLRB's") interpretation of a statutory provision with the Court's own
prior judicial interpretation to the contrary.69 In Lechmere, the Court quoted
Maislin and concluded that its prior construction trumped the NLRB's subsequent views: "Once we have determined a statute's clear meaning, we
adhere to that determination under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we
judge the agency's later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning."7 ° Here too the Court's characterization
of its prior precedent as a determination of the "clear" meaning of the statute is somewhat vague. 1 However, an examination of the prior precedent
that the Court relied upon in Lechmere demonstrates that the prior precedent merely represented the Court's own pre-Chevron attempt at construing
an ambiguous statutory term.72 In other words, it was the Court's own construction of the statute in the prior case-not the statute itself-that rendered the meaning of the statute clear and thus prevented the NLRB from
adopting a contrary construction.
After Lechmere came the last case in the trio: Neal v. United States.73
In Neal, the Court refused to defer to an interpretation of the United States
Sentencing Commission because the Court already had reached an independent conclusion about what the statute required in a prior case." Here
resented the Court's "own understanding of the requirements of the policies underlying the Interstate
Commerce Act"); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
1016, n.l 1 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("When Maislin Industries referred to the Court's prior determination of a statute's 'clear meaning,' it was referring to the fact that the prior decision had made the
statute clear, and was not conducting a retrospective inquiry into whether the prior decision had declared
the statute itself to be clear on its own terms.").
67 Alternatively, the Court could have been suggesting that the statute carried a "clear" meaning-in
other words, that there was only one permissible reading of the statute. See White, supra note 16, at
744-45.
68 502 U.S. 527 (1992).
69 In the prior case, the Court interpreted the term "unfair labor practice" as it is used within the Act,
concluding that the Act requires that employers refrain from interfering with employees' rights to organize but that the Act does not prohibit employers from forbidding non-employees from using the employer's property for union organization if other means of communicating with employees are available.
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 105, 109-14 (1956).
70 Id. at 536-37 (quoting Maislin, 497 U.S. at 131) (emphasis added).
71 See generally Pierce, supra note 61, at 2249.
72 See id.

73 Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996).
74 See id. at 295 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)). Notably, the Court in
Chapman refused to defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation of the statute not because the
interpretation conflicted with the statutory text but rather because its interpretation conflicted with the
Court's own prior interpretation in Chapman. See id. See generally Polsky, supra note 29, at 202, n.99.
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the Court essentially borrowed from Maislin and Lechmere's language but
with one significant change: it omitted Maislin's and Lechmere's use of the
qualifier "clear."75 Specifically, the Court declared: "Once we have determined a statute's meaning, we adhere to our ruling under the doctrine of
stare decisis, and we assess an agency's later interpretation of the statute
against that settled law."76
When read together, Maislin, Lechmere and Neal indicated that principles of stare decisis prevent agencies from trumping the Supreme Court's
own judicial constructions of statutory ambiguities." In addition, the trio
appeared to protect independent judicial constructions issued by the lower
federal courts as well," thereby preventing agencies from utilizing Chevron
to trump the stare decisis effect not only of Supreme Court precedent but
also the rulings of the circuit courts. A stare decisis "exception" to Chevron, accordingly, seemed to have taken root in Maislin, Lechmere and Neal.
B. The Court's Decision in Mead
The practical importance of Maislin, Lechmere and Neal's apparent
creation of a stare decisis exception to Chevron did not garner much atten75 See generally Murphy, supra note 3, at 43, n.203 (asserting that because Neal omitted the qualifier "clear," the case "taken at face value ... indicates that the power of a judicial precedent to block
agency departures should not turn on whether the precedent required the court to resolve statutory ambiguity").
76 Neal, 516 U.S. at 295.
77 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 3, at 36 & n.184 ("[O]ne can read Neal in particular as standing for
the proposition that any non-Chevron judicial statutory construction should trump an agency's attempt
to depart from it."); Polsky, supra note 29, at 202 ("[T]he trilogy of decisions ending with Neal provides
that when the Court has independently interpreted a term on a prior occasion, that interpretation becomes 'incorporated' into the statute and binds the executive branch."); Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in MidPassage: The Uneasy PartnershipBetween Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J.
221, 245 n. 129 (1996) (citing Lechmere, Maislin and Neal for the proposition that the Court has "refus[ed] to grant Chevron deference when an agency's interpretation conflicts with an earlier judicial
construction of the statute"); Jennifer J. McGruther, Note, Chevron vs. Stare Decisis: Should Circuit
Courts Follow Judicial Precedent or Defer to Agencies As Mandated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
NRDC?, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 611, 611 n.4 (2003) (citing Neal for the proposition that the Court is not
required to defer to agencies after the Court has already judicially construed a statute).
78 See, e.g., Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
("[W]e conclude that the Court of Federal Claims erred in holding that, on the facts of this case, an Executive agency regulation could effectively construe a statute in a manner different from a prior definitive court ruling."); BPS Guard Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 942 F.2d 519, 523 (8th Cir. 1991) ("Chevron does
not stand for the proposition that administrative agencies may reject, with impunity, the controlling
precedent of a superior judicial body."); John F. Manning, NonlegislativeRules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
893, 942, n.234 (2004) (noting that the Court's approach in Neal, Lechmere and Maislin "suggest[s] that
when a circuit court independently construes an agency-administered statute, the resulting precedent
should count as the law of the circuit even if the agency later issues a contrary interpretation in a Chevron-eligible format"). But see McGruther, supra note 77, at 616 (noting disagreement among lower
courts as to whether courts should follow Chevron and defer to agencies despite conflicting circuit
precedent); Wald, supra note 77, at 245, n.129 (noting that the Supreme Court's stare decisis exception
"has not played a substantial role in D.C. Circuit jurisprudence").
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tion until the Court handed down United States v. Mead Corporation in
2001.'9 In Mead, the Court significantly limited the universe of Chevroneligible agency interpretations." This significantly increased the number of
cases in which courts must independently resolve statutory ambiguity,
which in turn brought the clash between stare decisis and Chevron to the
fore.
On the one hand, if courts adhered to Maislin, Lechmere and Neal and
continued to prefer stare decisis over Chevron, then independent judicial
statutory constructions issued in the absence of a binding agency interpretation would freeze-or "ossify"-the meaning of ambiguous statutory provisions into place.8' On the other hand, if courts abandoned notions of stare
decisis, then judicial decisions independently construing statutes would "enter[] some nether world of impermanence hitherto unknown to our jurisprudence"82 and inconsistency in application of the statute would result.83
Justice Scalia highlighted this dilemma in his dissenting opinion in
Mead.84 Justice Scalia argued that by limiting the universe of Chevroneligible interpretations, the Court's decision in Mead would have the effect
of increasing the number of independent judicial constructions. In turn, the
increase in judicial interpretation would lock agencies out of the interpretive
process because stare decisis (d la Maislin, Lechmere and Neal) would
freeze the judicial construction into place and take away agency flexibility.85 Specifically, he explained that once a court independently construes a
statute pursuant to Skidmore, "the court has spoken, [and] it becomes

79 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
8o Id.; see also id. at 240-41 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1275 (not-

ing that Mead "limited the types of agency interpretations that are binding on the courts").
81 See Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1275-76 (arguing that adhering to stare decisis "threatens,
across a host of substantive areas, to replace administrative flexibility with unchanging judicial rules,
freezing regulatory policy even as science, society and policy evolve"); Murphy, supra note 3, at 3-4
(identifying ossification problem that could arise if judicial construction of a statute could "freeze this
construction into place, thereby blocking agencies from adopting new interpretations in light of evolving
learning and policies").
82 William S. Jordan, JudicialReview of Informal Statutory Interpretations: The Answer is Chevron
Step Two, Not Christensen or Mead, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 719, 724 (2002).
83 See Nat'l Republican Cong. Comm. v. Legi-Tech Corp., 795 F.2d 190, 194, n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[1]f the [Federal Election) Commission were free to reject our interpretation and proceeded to do so,
the untoward result would be the inconsistent application of [the statute].").
84 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the majority's approach will lead
to the ossification of large portions of our statutory law"). See generally Bamberger, supra note 20, at
1275; Murphy, supra note 3, at 3-4; Polsky, supranote 29, at 195-207; Paul A. Dame, Note, Stare Decisis, Chevron, and Skidmore: Do Administrative Agencies Have the Power to Overrule Courts?, 44
WM. & MARY L. REV. 405 (2002).
85 Mead, 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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unlawful for the agency to take a contradictory position; the statute now
says what the court has prescribed."86
Despite Justice Scalia's lengthy dissenting opinion in Mead, the majority of the Court said nothing about the ossification problem posed by the intersection between the Neal-Lechmere-Maislin trio and Mead. Instead, the
Court remained silent on the stare decisis issue, apparently preferring to
await a future case before attempting to respond to how Mead and the Maislin-Lechmere-Neal trio would work together. As it turned out, the Court
did not need to wait long.8"
C. Brand X: Allowing Chevron to Trump Stare Decisis
Soon after the Court handed down Mead, the Ninth Circuit decided
Brand X Internet Services v. Federal Communications Commission." In
Brand X, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reviewed the FCC's decision to classify cable modem service as an interstate information service
rather than a "telecommunications service" within the meaning of the
Communications Act of 1934.89 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
that Chevron normally governs review of an agency's construction of a
statute, 90 the Court of Appeals refused to apply Chevron in reviewing the
FCC's decision because the FCC was neither "the only, nor even the first,
authoritative body to have interpreted the provisions of the Communications Act as applied to cable broadband service." 9' Rather, several years before the FCC issued its construction, the Ninth Circuit had ruled in AT&T v.
City of Portlandthat the term "telecommunications service" includes cable
modem service. 92 In Brand X, the Ninth Circuit-relying on the Supreme
Court's adherence to stare decisis in Neal--concluded that it was bound by
86 Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. at 249-50 ("What a court says is the law after according
Skidmore deference will be the law forever, beyond the power of the agency to change even through
rulemaking.").
87 Shortly after Mead, the Court toyed with the battle between stare decisis and Chevron in Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106 (2002). In that case, the Court seemed to suggest that an
agency might remain free to override even a court's independent statutory construction arrived at using
Skidmore deference. Id. at 114 & n.8 (suggesting that agency would remain free to change its statutory
interpretation regardless of whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applied). The Court, however, buried this suggestion in a footnote that (to put it generously) was rather cryptically worded. See id. at 114
n.8. In addition, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurring opinion in which she expressed "doubt
that it is possible to reserve th[e] question [of Chevron deference] while simultaneously maintaining, as
the Court does, that the agency is free to change its interpretation." Id. at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment) (citation omitted). Thus, the Court's decision in Edelman-much like its decision in
Mead-did not definitively resolve the stare decisis issue but rather kept the debate simmering.
88 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003).
89 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(44) (2000) (subjecting all providers of "telecommunications service[e]" to
mandatory common-carrier regulation).
90 BrandX, 345 F.3d at 1127.
9IId.

92 AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000).
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its prior City of Portland decision and that the FCC's new construction of93
the statute could not trump the court's own prior judicial determination.
The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion and foreclosed the FCC's new interpretation even though the FCC had not been a party to the City of Portland case.94

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Ninth Circuit erred in relying on Neal and that it erroneously elevated stare decisis
over Chevron.95

The Court explained that "Chevron established a 'pre-

sumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be
resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather
than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows."96 Allowing a judicial precedent "to foreclose an agency from interpreting an ambiguous statute" would contravene Chevron's central premise
that "it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory gaps."97 The Court thus
set forth the following new rule: "A court's prior judicial construction of a
statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from
the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency
discretion."9 Where a judicial precedent construing a statute does not indicate that the statute unambiguously forecloses alternative meanings, then
the "agency may ...

choose a different construction, since the agency re-

93 Although all three panel members agreed that the doctrine of stare decisis foreclosed the FCC's
conflicting construction of the Act, Judge O'Scannlain wrote a separate concurring opinion. In his concurrence, Judge O'Scannlain expressed concern about allowing three judges to tell an "agency acting
within the area of its expertise that its interpretation of the statute it is charged with administering cannot
stand-and that [the court's] interpretation of how the Act should be applied to a 'quicksilver technological environment,' is the correct, indeed the only, interpretation." Brand X, 345 F.3d at 1133-34
(O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (citation omitted). By foreclosing the FCC's interpretation and freezing
the Ninth Circuit's City of Portlandinterpretation into place, Judge O'Scannlain worried that the court
was "effectively stop[ping] a vitally important policy debate in its tracks." Id. at 1133.
94 The FCC did file an amicus brief in the City of Portlandcase but declined to weigh in on the issue of statutory interpretation facing the Ninth Circuit. See Brief of the FCC as Amicus Curiae at 2930, AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, No. 99-35609, 1999 WL 33631595 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 1999) (declining to impose regulations and stressing the need for caution given the nascent, developing nature of
the technology at issue).
95 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-84 (2005). Interestingly, the Court addressed the relationship between Chevron and stare decisis even though it could
have ducked the question entirely. See id. at 985 (acknowledging that it was not necessary for the Court
to determine the stare decisis effect of the City of Portlanddecision); see also id. at 1019-20 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Court did not need to resolve the Chevron issue because, whatever the effect of the City of Portlanddecision in the Ninth Circuit, the decision had no binding effect on the Supreme Court).
96 Id. at 982 (quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1996)).
97 Id.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
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mains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of such statutes." 99
The new rule set forth by the Court in BrandX appears to be supported
by two separate justifications. First, notions of congressional intent support
the Court's rule: by delegating interpretive authority to an agency, Congress intends the agency to act as the "authoritative interpreter" of ambiguity in the statute.0 0 If an agency fails to exercise its congressionallydelegated interpretive powers, the courts remain free to impose their own
interpretation in the interim. But if the agency later elects to exercise its
congressionally-delegated powers to select a contrary construction, Chevron
commands that the courts apply the agency's construction, so long as it is
reasonable.
Second, the Court's decision in BrandX also rests on a desire to avoid
the concerns Justice Scalia raised in Mead about the "ossification of large
portions of our statutory law."'' Allowing stare decisis to trump Chevron
would have meant that an agency's congressionally-delegated lawmaking
powers could be usurped due to a simple fluke of timing: "If the court's
construction came first, its construction would prevail, whereas if the
agency's came first, the agency's construction would command Chevron
deference."'0 2 By refusing to allow a mere coincidence of timing to determine who has ultimate interpretive authority, the Court adhered to a central
premise underlying Chevron: that allowing Congress to allocate primary
interpretive authority to agencies rather than to the courts furthers notions
of competency, accountability, and democratic legitimacy in the interpretive
process by enabling courts to leave policy decisions to agency decisionmakers." 3 Thus, the new rule established in Brand X remains true to Chevron and its basis in congressional intent.
Despite the sound justifications for the Court's new rule, the rule does
represent a substantial departure from the Court's prior precedents in Maislin, Lechmere and Neal."0 In addition, as Justice Scalia pointed out in his
99 Id. at 983.

1ooId.
101Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
102 Id.
103 See generally Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1283-84 (noting that Chevron was "consistent with
structural and normative conceptions-rooted in notions of competence, accountability, and democratic
legitimacy-about the proper location of political decisionmaking"); Chevron Deference, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 395, 401 (2005) (asserting that a contrary holding in Brand X "would have established immutable
interpretations of statutes, undermining Congress's intent to allow agencies the flexibility necessary to
achieve evolving constructions").
104 Justice Scalia was the only Justice to acknowledge the incongruity between the Court's prior
precedents and the new rule set forth in Brand X. In a lengthy dissent in BrandX, Justice Scalia criticized the majority for engaging in a revisionist reading of the Maislin-Lechmere-Nealtrio. Specifically,
he argued that Neal "plainly rejected the notion that any form of deference could cause the Court to revisit a prior statutory-construction holding" and that Maislin--the oldest case in the trio-did "not rely
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dissenting opinion in BrandX, the Court's new rule raises interesting separation of powers questions by-for the first time ever-condoning the notion of "judicial decisions subject to reversal by Executive officers."'' 5
In responding to Justice Scalia's reliance on the Maislin-LechmereNeal trio of cases, the majority concluded that the cases established only
that a precedent holding a statute to be "clear" forecloses a contrary agency
construction." 6 In other words, the majority-engaging in a rather creative
interpretation of the prior precedents-ducked the Maislin-Lechmere-Neal
trio by determining that the cases did not foreclose an agency from overriding a court's independent interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision
but rather only foreclosed an agency from overriding a court's interpretation
of an unambiguous statutory provision. 7
The Court also brushed away Justice Scalia's concerns about allowing
judicial decisions to be subject "to reversal by Executive officers."'0 8 The
Court did not dispute that its decision in BrandX will allow agencies to alter a court's interpretation of the best reading of a statute. 0 9 The Court,
however, made clear that this is not equivalent to "subject[ing] judicial decisions to reversal by Executive officers," as Justice Scalia charged." Specifically, the Court explained:
Since Chevron teaches that a court's opinion as to the "best" reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with administering is not authoritative,
the agency's decision to construe that statute differently from a court does not
say that the court's holding was legally wrong. Instead, the agency may, consistent with the court's holding, choose a different construction, since the
agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits of reason) of
such statutes."
In this sense, the majority noted that the new rule erected in BrandX would
not allow a judicial precedent to be "'reversed' by the agency[] any more
than a federal court's interpretation can be said to have been 'reversed' by a

on a prior decision that held the statute to be clear, but on a run-of-the-mill statutory interpretation contained in a 1908 decision." BrandX,545 U.S. at 1016, n.l I (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105 Id. at 1016-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia attacked the majority for creating what he
saw as a "breathtaking" and "probably unconstitutional" novelty: "judicial decisions subject to reversal
by Executive officers." Id. Specifically, he argued that allowing agencies to sit in review of courts
raised serious separation of powers concerns because "Article IIt courts do not sit to render decisions
that can be reversed or ignored by Executive officers." Id. at 1017 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106 BrandX,545 U.S. at 984.
107

Id.

108 Id. at
109 Id.

110 Id.
I"' Id.
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state court that adopts a conflicting (yet authoritative) interpretation of state
law."'12
Thus, in the end, neither the Court's past pronouncements in the
Maislin-Lechmere-Neal trio nor Justice Scalia's separation of powers
concerns prevented the Court from adopting a significant new rule:
Chevron-eligible agencies may override independent judicial constructions
of ambiguous statutes." 3
IIl.

DRAWING ON THE LESSONS OF THE FEDERALISM MODEL:
TOWARD AN INTERACTIVE INTERPRETIVE MODEL

Although the full implications of the Court's decision in Brand Xhave
yet to unfold," 4 it is clear that the Court's decision in Brand X breaks significant new ground." 5 For the first time ever, the Court expressly sanctioned the notion that a Chevron-eligible agency can overrule a court's own
independent judicial construction of what a statute means."6 By enabling
agencies to trump statutory precedents, the Court "dramatically altered" the
judiciary's role in the interpretive process," 7 paving the way for independent judicial constructions of statutes to amount to nothing more than an interim precedent to be cast aside at the will of an agency.
112

Id. at 983-84. Whether the Court ultimately was correct to reject Justice Scalia's separation of

powers concern is not a question that this Article seeks to resolve. Rather, this Article accepts Brand X
as a reality and proceeds to examine the ramifications of the decision. For an argument that Justice
Scalia's concerns are misplaced, see Doug Geyser, Note, Courts Still "Say What the Law Is": Explaining the Functions of the Judiciary and Agencies After Brand X, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 2129 (2006).
113 In an intriguing one-paragraph concurrence, Justice Stevens suggested that perhaps the Court's
new rule might be limited to the lower federal courts. Specifically, Justice Stevens opined that even
though "a court of appeals' interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a regulatory statute does not"
freeze the court's reading into place at the expense of a later agency interpretation, perhaps a decision by
the Supreme Court might do so. BrandX, 545 U.S. at 1003 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens,
however, did not explain the basis for this suggestion. Nor did any other Justices join his concurrence.
There is, therefore, no indication that the other Justices viewed the Court's new rule as being limited to
the lower court context.
114The Courts have just begun to interpret and apply BrandX's command. See. e.g., Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2006) (deferring to an EPA regulation
and allowing the regulation to trump a prior judicial precedent); Skranak v. Castenada, 425 F.3d 1213,
1220 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing BrandXfor the proposition that the "Forest Service is not bound to interpret
the statute the same way we have when considering it de novo"); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., LLC,
No. 00-994, 2007 WL 582555, at *5-6 (D. Del. Feb. 13, 2007) (applying BrandXand concluding that a
Third Circuit precedent did not preclude the SEC from adopting a new interpretation of statutory ambiguity); see also Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2007); Elm Grove Coal Co. v.
Director, O.W.C.P., No. 05-1108, 2007 WL 678248, at *9 (4th Cir. Mar. 7, 2007).
115See, e.g., AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (Brand X"dramatically altered the respective roles of courts and agencies under Chevron.").
116See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 248-49 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("I know
of no case, in the entire history of the federal courts, in which we have allowed a judicial interpretation
of a statute to be set aside by an agency-or have allowed a lower court to render an interpretation of a
statute subject to correction by an agency.").
117AARP, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
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By handing Chevron a victory in the longstanding battle between 'the
Marbury-esque' view[] that agencies must abide by judicial constructions... and the... 'Chevron-esque' view[] that agencies should enjoy the
power to interpret their statutory mandates flexibly,"" 8 the Court did create
a solution to the ossification problem posed by Mead. In creating a solution
to one problem, however, the Court raised an entirely new set of problems
concerning the judiciary's role in the interpretive process." 9 Most prominently, Brand X raises questions about whether federal courts faced with
unresolved regulatory law should go ahead and construe statutory ambiguities in the absence of agency views on the subject-thereby inviting the
agency to either override the court's interpretation or to refuse to acquiesce
in the interpretation. 2 ° Or is there an alternative approach that courts could
use to minimize those situations where courts must independently resolve
statutory ambiguity prior to the relevant agency weighing in on the issue?
A.

Erie and the FederalismModel's Use of Interactive Tools

In thinking about how the federal courts might adapt to their newly reduced role in the interpretive process, the federalism model provides a useful analogy.'
In the federalism context, the Supreme Court's seminal 1938
decision in Erie Railroadv. Tompkins.. forced the federal courts to significantly rethink their lawmaking role.'
In Erie, the Court commanded that
federal courts apply state law in all cases not governed by positive federal
law, thereby stripping the federal courts of the authority to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.'24 Erie's command that fedMurphy, supra note 3, at 3.
119See, e.g., Note, Implementing Brand X: What Counts As a Step One Holding?, 119 HARV. L.
REv. 1532 (2006) (focusing on one question raised by Brand X-namely, how courts should identify
when prior judicial holdings flow from the "unambiguous" terms of the statute).
120 Agency refusal to acquiesce in adverse court rulings-although controversial-would not be a
new phenomenon. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989) (describing the "refusal of administrative agencies to conduct their internal proceedings consistently with adverse rulings of the courts of appeals-a
practice commonly termed agency nonacquiescence").
121The logic of looking to the federalism model finds support in the BrandX decision itself where
the Court drew on the federalism analogy in an attempt to respond to Justice Scalia's charge that the
Court's new rule allowed for executive "override[s]" of judicial decisions. See BrandX, 545 U.S. 967,
983-84 (2005) (noting that the rule erected in BrandX would not allow a judicial precedent to be "'reversed' by the agency[] any more than a federal court's interpretation can be said to have been 'reversed' by a state court that adopts a conflicting (yet authoritative) interpretation of state law"). It also
is supported by an article published prior to the Court's decision in BrandX, which argued that the conflict between Chevron and stare decisis could be solved by drawing on the federalism model's use of
"provisional" precedent. See Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1276.
122 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
123 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004) (noting that Erie heralded a "significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts").
124 304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress,
118

the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state .... There is no federal general common law.").
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eral courts "apply but not declare state law" seemed simple enough to adhere to when state law provided a clear answer, but it proved considerably
more difficult for federal courts to follow when faced with applying ambiguous state law.'25 In such situations, the federal courts essentially were
forced to "predict" how the state would come out on the unresolved issue.'26
A federal court's "prediction" would prevail in the particular case before
the federal court and could bind other federal courts, but it would not subsequently bind the state courts.127 Rather, policymaking agents of the state
would remain free to adopt an alternative construction and to thereby wipe
away the federal court's reading of state law.' 28
To try to adapt to their reduced role in the lawmaking process, the federal courts began to use various mechanisms that enabled federal courts to
seek out a state's views on an unclear issue of law before ruling on the issue. First came various "Erie-basedabstention" doctrines that allowed the
federal courts to abstain from deciding cases that presented unresolved
questions of state law.'29 In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., for example, the Court
created a type of "administrative abstention" whereby federal courts could
abstain if federal proceedings would interfere with a detailed state regulatory scheme. 3
Similarly, in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, the Court approved a district court's decision to stay federal
proceedings until the state's highest court had been afforded an opportunity
to interpret ambiguity in the state's eminent domain statute-a statute that
was intimately involved with the state's sovereign prerogatives.' 3' In con125

Clark, supra note 25, at 1461 (emphasis in original); see also Kaye & Weissman, supra note 25,

at 376 (noting that Erie created a "thorny problem" relating to how federal courts "should ascertain state
law in cases where it is unclear").
126 See Clark, supra note 25, at 1466 (noting that when federal courts face an unclear issue of state
law, most federal courts "attempt to predict" how the state's highest court would rule); see also Naguin
v. Prudential Assurance Co., 71 F.3d 512, 512 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating the court was forced to make an
"Erie guess"); Todd v. Societe Bic, S.A., 21 F.3d 1402, 1416 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., dissenting) (referring to the difficulty of making "Erie guesses") (citing Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge
Views DiversityJurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism,78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679 (1992)); Kaye
& Weissman, supra note 25, at 377.
127 Todd, 21 F.3d at 1416.
128 See, e.g., id. ("In any diversity case, this court's decision has no precedential effect on the state
courts."); see also Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 146 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("[T]he decision
of a federal court (even this Court) on a question of state law is not binding on state tribunals .... );
Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1395 (7th Cir. 1992) ("State courts are not bound
by federal courts' interpretations of state law.").
129 Clark, supra note 25, at 1517-24 (discussing "Erie-based abstention"); see also David Frisch,
Contractual Choice of Law and the PrudentialFoundations of Appellate Review, 56 VAND. L. REV. 57,
107 (2003) ("In the immediate aftermath of Erie, when state law was unclear, many federal courts,
rather than risking incorrect determinations, chose to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction until the
state court was given an opportunity to resolve the state law issue.").
130 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943).
131 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) ("The special nature of eminent domain justifies a district judge, when
his familiarity with problems of local law so counsels him, to ascertain the meaning of a disputed state
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doning the use of these and other abstention doctrines,"' the Court noted
that abstention could help to "avoid the waste of a tentative decision" as
well as to minimize "friction" between the federal courts and the states.'33
Despite the theoretical appeal of minimizing federal-state friction by
enabling federal courts to defer to state decision makers on questions of
state law, abstention has proved somewhat problematic in practice because
parties are required to go through a full round of litigation in the state courts
after a federal court abstains-resulting in added expense and delays.'34 In
addition, the Court limited the potential reach of judge-made abstention
doctrines by making clear that abstention cannot be invoked merely because
a federal court finds it difficult to ascertain state law or because a federal
court wants to demonstrate deference toward state decision makers.' 35
Rather, the Court announced that federal courts have a "virtually unflagging
obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction given to them and therefore are
obliged to read the Court's judge-made abstention doctrines narrowly.'36
Given the limitations of abstention, an alternative and more promising
mechanism soon emerged: state certification procedures.' 37 State certification procedures have been touted as more efficient and less costly than abstention because they allow a federal court to "certify" unresolved questions

statute from the only tribunal empowered to speak definitively-the courts of the State under whose
statute eminent domain is sought to be exercised-rather than himself make a dubious and tentative
forecast."); see also Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953, 957 (3d Cir. 1993)
(noting that Thibodaux, which "permits a federal court to abstain in a diversity case where state law is
unclear and an important state interest is at stake," really stands as "a variant of the Burford abstention
doctrine and has not evolved as a separate doctrine of its own").
132 See, e.g., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941) (allowing the use
of abstention in a federal question case where state law was unclear and resolution of state law issue
could render unnecessary the resolution of a federal constitutional issue).
133 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500; see also Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28.
134 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 76 (1997) (noting that although abstention was desirable in theory, it "proved protracted and expensive in practice"); see also Martha A.
Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 591 (1991) ("The delay and expense inherent in the abstention procedure are legendary, and have caused some judges and commentators to
bemoan the doctrine from the outset."). Abstention also has been criticized on the ground that it violates
notions of separation of powers. See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76-77 (1984) (arguing that judge-made abstention constitutes judicial lawmaking in violation of notions of separation of powers by depriving litigants of a
judicial forum provided for by Congress).
135 Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 27 (1959); Meredith v. Winter Haven,
320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
136 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817 (1976) (noting
that only "exceptional circumstances" justify a federal court's refusal to abstain from deciding a case in
deference to state courts).
137 See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 25, at 385-86 (noting that as of 2000, forty-five states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico allowed their courts to answer questions certified from other
courts); JONA GOLDSCHMIDT, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW: FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE I
(1995); Clark, supra note 25, at 1544.

1020

101:997 (2007)

Adapting to Administrative Law's Erie Doctrine

of state law directly to a state's highest court."' If the state's highest court
agrees to answer the certified question and sends an answer back to the federal court,' 3 9 then the federal court resolves the case in accord with the state

court's authoritative ruling. 4 This enables the federal court to avoid having to "guess" how the state courts would resolve the state law issue and
helps to minimize the likelihood of an erroneous federal court reading of
state law.14 ' State certification, accordingly, emerged as a mechanism that
was thought to save "'time, energy, and resources' and also to "hel[p]
build a cooperative judicial federalism." 42 In other words, certification enabled the federal courts to interact and communicate with state courts in the
wake of Erie rather
than blindly imposing their own interpretations on un14 3
clear state law.

B. CarryingErie's Lessons Over into the AdministrativeRealm

The development of an interactive model in the federalism context in
the wake of Erie is instructive in terms of suggesting how the federal courts
might react to their newly reduced role in the administrative realm postBrand X. Without a doubt, the analogy between Brand X and Erie is not
perfect. Whereas federal courts in the federalism context must construe a
138

See Theodore B. Eichelberger, Note, CertificationStatutes: Engineeringa Solution to Pullman

Abstention Delay, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1984) ("While the certification procedure does
not completely eliminate the delay in deciding a case, the delay is usually substantially shorter than that
incurred after an abstention order.").
139 State courts do not always agree to answer questions that are certified to them. See, e.g.,
Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Serio, 261 F.3d 143, 152 n.14 (2d Cir. 2001); see also GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 137, at 46.
140 See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mallela, 372 F.3d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The certification process 'permits the federal courts to ask the highest court of a state directly to resolve a question
of state law and to do so while the federal suit is pending."' (quoting Allstate, 261 F.3d at 151)).
141 See Kaye & Weissman, supra note 25, at 381 ("[C]ertification saves federal courts from the
awkwardness of predicting state law, and allows state high courts to articulate the law without the complication of potentially contradictory federal decisions on the issue."); see also GOLDSCHMIDT, supra
note 137, at 1, 53.
142 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 77 (1997) (citing Lehman Bros v.
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)).
143 See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1974) (noting that certification "does,
of
course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism"); David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 545 (1985) (concluding
that federal courts' ability to exercise its discretion to decline to hear a case "contribute[s] to the easing
of interbranch and intergovernmental tensions"); Julie A. Davies, Pullman and Burford Abstention:
Clarifying the Roles of State and Federal Courts in Constitutional Cases, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 910 (1986) (noting that Pullman abstention may "further harmony between federal and state courts because federal courts defer to state courts on unclear state law issues," which "allows states to chart the
course of their own law without the threat of erroneous federal court interference"); GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 137, at I ("One area in which federal and state courts have an opportunity to interact in the
spirit of cooperative federalism is that of certification of questions of law."); Gerald M. Levin, Note, Inter-JurisdictionalCertification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, Ill U.
PA. L. REV. 344, 350 (1963) (noting that certification represents an "attempt at cooperative judicial federalism").

1021

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

body of state law that belongs to the states and thus must try to "predict" the
meaning of unresolved state law questions, federal courts in the administrative law context are construing purely federal law and thus-in the absence
of binding agency views-must provide a judicial construction of the ambiguous term rather than merely "predicting" what an agency might do in
the future.'" Furthermore, Erie's reallocation of power between the federal
and state courts can be seen as resting primarily on notions of federalism
and comity and the desire to protect states' sovereignty by allowing states
to maintain control over their own state law. In contrast, in the administrative law context, the reallocation of authority between courts and agencies
that took place in Chevron and Brand X can be seen as resting primarily on
notions of Congress's delegatory intent, as well as "quasi-separation of
powers" principles such as notions of political accountability and competence.
Despite these differences, Erie and Brand X share one significant thing
in common: both significantly reduced the lawmaking power of the federal
courts by reallocating lawmaking authority to other institutions and thereby
put federal courts in the position of interpreting laws that they ultimately
lack the power to definitively construe.'45 The federal courts' willingness to
react to their reduced lawmaking power in the federalism context by moving toward a more interactive model demonstrates that the federal courts
similarly could adapt to their newly reduced role in the administrative
realm.'46 In other words, the Erie analogy is useful to show that the federal
courts-when faced with a significant reduction in their lawmaking authority-previously were willing to accept procedures that demonstrated defer-

144Forcing courts to "predict" an agency's future interpretation also would be inappropriate because
it would require the courts to openly rely on non-legal tools to construe statutory ambiguity. For example, a court trying to "predict" what the EPA might do under a new Republican administration would
have to take the President's policy goals and politics into account in arriving at a construction of an ambiguous statutory term.
145See Cass R. Sunstein, Is TobaccoA Drug? Administrative Agencies As Common Law Courts, 47
DUKE L.J. 1013, 1057 n.215 (1998) (noting that Chevron "has much in common" with Erie because
"[b]oth cases involve a rejection of the view that federal courts could neutrally declare 'the law,' and
both cases, following that rejection, reallocate legal authority from federal courts to other institutions").
146 A few scholars have discussed similarities between Erie (or the federalism model more generally) and Chevron in the past See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on
Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1785, 1795-1801 (1997) (describing Chevron as an
example of the "Erie-effect" where "a change in the interpretive context" of institutional authority
brings about a reallocation of institutional authority among legal actors); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2583 (2006) (suggesting that
both Erie and Chevron share an important understanding of what interpretation involves: the understanding that "[w]hen courts resolve genuine ambiguities, they cannot appeal to any 'brooding omnipresence in the sky' but rather "must rely on policy judgments of their own"); see also Sunstein, supra
note 145, at 1057 n.215. Most prominently, Professor Bamberger argued prior to Brand X that the ossification problem posed by Mead could be solved by drawing on the federalism model's acceptance of
"provisional" precedent. See Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1275-76.
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ence toward outside institutions that ultimately possess the authoritative
power to construe the law.
Drawing on Erie's lessons and moving toward a more interactive
model in the administrative realm could yield significant benefits. First, respect for the primacy of the agency as the authoritative statutory interpreter
would be furthered if courts interact with and seek out the views of the governing agency prior to issuing their own statutory constructions of ambiguous terms. Chevron placed lawmaking primacy in the hands of the
governing agency, and BrandX underscores the fact that agencies-not the
47
courts-serve as the authoritative interpreters of statutory ambiguity.
Thus, where an agency with delegated lawmaking powers has yet to construe an ambiguous statute, respect for the primacy of the agency suggests
that the agency should be given a chance to weigh in before the court issues
its own construction.
Second, an interactive approach would allow the courts to benefit from
the comparative expertise of the relevant agency. As Tom Merrill and Kristin Hickman have contended, "federal statutory programs have become so
complex that it is beyond the capacity of most federal judges to understand
the full ramifications of the narrowly framed interpretational questions that
come before them.' '

4

'

This may mean "that the goal of resolving statutory

ambiguities in such a way as to further the purposes of the statute is increasingly becoming a task beyond the grasp of generalist judges."'4 9 An interactive approach through which courts seek out relevant agency expertise
would help courts to better understand the ramifications of the interpretive
questions before them and could lead to better decisions in the first place.
Outside the agency context, the courts have long recognized that significant benefits can flow from obtaining assistance from specialists. The
courts, for example, often appoint experts to assist them with complex or
technical matters in appropriate cases. 5 ° In addition, the Supreme Court
frequently asks for the advice of the Solicitor General in cases where the
government is not a party to the case.' 5 ' The judiciary's willingness to seek
out the views of experts in these contexts serves as an important reminder
that generalist judges can benefit from soliciting expert views.
147Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983 (2005) ("[A]

court's opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with administering is
not authoritative ....).
148Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 861.
149 Id. at 862.

ISO
See generally John F. Duffy, On Improving the Legal Process ofClaim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 142 & n. 128 (2000) (discussing courts' power to appoint nonwitness experts in appropriate cases); see also FED. R. EVID. 706.
151 See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 714
(2005); Fed. Trade Comm. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 544 (2005); Cruz v. Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Illinois, 126 S. Ct. 414 (2005); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S.
Ct. 414 (2005); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 327 (2005).
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Third, an interactive approach would enable courts to minimize the
number of cases where the courts must engage in judicial policymaking.
One of the primary reasons why Chevron prefers agency interpretations to
judicial interpretations is that selecting one reading of an ambiguous statute
over another can be viewed as a "political act" that turns on policy ques-

tions.' Because courts are rather ill-suited to engage in policymaking,'53 an
interactive model-whereby the federal courts seek out and solicit agency
views priorto imposing their own judicial construction-would help minimize those situations where the courts must impose their own individual
policy preferences on a public to which they are not democratically accountable.
Fourth, by decreasing those situations where courts will be faced with
construing ambiguous statutory provisions in the dark without agency assistance, an interactive approach would decrease those situations where agencies might feel compelled to "override" or to refuse to acquiesce in a court
decision. This would not only help to minimize interbranch friction but

54
also would help to bring more uniformity and predictability to the law,'
thereby protecting the judiciary's institutional legitimacy as well as individual reliance interests.'
Fifth, even apart from the goal of avoiding interbranch friction, notions
efficiency and fairness to litigants provide yet another reason
judicial
of
why it might be valuable to avoid situations where a court's view of regulatory law is later overruled by an agency.'56 If an agency stands as the ultimate authority on the meaning of an ambiguous statutory provision, then a
court's efforts could be viewed as "wasted" if the court goes through the
152 Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 861; see also Farina, supra note 29, at 467 (noting that

Chevron deference rests in part on the notion that the judiciary "is an inappropriate body to make the
kinds of policy choices that are unavoidable in construing contemporary regulatory statutes").
153 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005) (noting
that filling statutory gaps "involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better equipped to make
than courts"); see also Murphy, supra note 3, at 40 ("[C]ourts are relatively ill-suited to the task of policymaking-judges are generalists who gather information through the incomplete, skewed process of
litigation.").
154 Uniformity and predictability, of course, will never be completely attainable in the regulatory
context given that Chevron-eligible agencies are free to change their mind over time. See Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984). However, uniformity and
predictability certainly should increase if courts solicit agency views when construing unresolved issues
of statutory ambiguity in the first instance.
155 Cf Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (explaining that one reason why stare decisis
is the preferred course is "because it promotes evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of
legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process").
156 An extreme example of the unfairness and lack of uniformity that could result post-Brand X if
courts and agencies do not communicate with each other is demonstrated by the following hypothetical:
Imagine that a court independently construes the meaning of an ambiguous statutory term in the context
of private litigation between party A and B, siding with A's reading of the statute. The agency then later
initiates an enforcement proceeding against party A and adopts a contrary reading of the statute.
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process of independently construing the statute in the absence of agency
views only to have the governing agency subsequently impose a contrary
construction.'57 In addition, the parties will have been deprived the opportunity to have their case decided under the authoritative view of the goveming agency should the agency subsequently disagree with the court's
provisional construction.'58
Given the benefits that could be obtained by utilizing an interactive approach in the administrative realm, the next question becomes: how could
the courts adapt to Brand X by moving toward a more interactive approach
to statutory interpretation in the administrative realm? Would the creation
of an interactive approach require major changes in the law?
IV. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL INTERACTIVE TOOLS

Moving toward a more "interactive" or "shared" approach to statutory
interpretation would not require any drastic doctrinal changes. Rather, as
this Part explains, the courts could move toward a more interactive approach simply by becoming increasingly willing to use tools that-although
often neglected-already have a foothold in the law.
A.

Callingfor the Views of the Relevant Agency

The first mechanism through which the courts could move toward a
more interactive approach is relatively simple: where a court faces an ambiguous statutory term in an agency-administered statute but the agency has
yet to weigh in on the ambiguity, the court could solicit the agency's views.
Two potential means of soliciting agency views are considered here: (1) referring the matter to the agency pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and (2) calling for the relevant agency to file an amicus curiae brief
setting forth its views. Both of these tools, of course, will reach only those
situations where the relevant agency is not a party to the case before the
court. Where the relevant agency is a party to the case, however, there is
little need for some sort of special interactive mechanism given that the
agency will be free to provide the court with its views during the course of
the litigation. Furthermore, where an agency is a party to the case, the court
always can consider whether it would be appropriate to remand the matter
157 Cf Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 778 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing in the federalism context that because state courts remain the "ultimate authority on the meaning" of state law, the Court's "efforts will have been wasted" if in later litigation the state court should
disagree with the Court's provisional state-law holding); R.R Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496, 500 (1941) ("The reign of law is hardly promoted if an unnecessary ruling of a federal court is thus
supplanted by a controlling decision of a state court.").
158 Cf Town of Castle Rock, Colo., 545 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing in the federalism context that should a state's highest court "disagree with this Court's provisional state-law holding,"
then the parties "will have been deprived of the opportunity to have [their] claims heard under the authoritative view of [the state's] law").
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back to the relevant agency for a decision,159 or whether doing so would
give the agency an unfair litigating advantage. 6
1. Invoking the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine.-One possible interactive mechanism through which the courts could solicit agency views
would involve referring the matter to the relevant agency pursuant to the

"primary jurisdiction" doctrine. 6' Much like the various abstention doctrines used in the federalism context,'62 primary jurisdiction serves as a
judge-made tool for allocating power between federal courts and agencies,'63 enabling "a court to stay its hand while allowing an agency to address issues within its ken."' 6 The label "primary jurisdiction" is a bit of a
misnomer because the doctrine does not seek to address those situations
where the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.'65 Rather, this prudential doctrine applies "when a claim is cognizable in federal court but requires resolution of an issue of first impression, or of a particularly
'
complicated issue that Congress has committed to a regulatory agency." 166
159 Cf. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA, 441 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(noting that the court generally will "remand for an agency to make the first interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term when"
the agency is a party to a case challenging agency action but the agency has failed to weigh in on the
meaning of the statute); PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F.3d 786, 798 (D.C.
Cir. 2004) (allowing agency to construe statutory ambiguity on remand); Jordan, supra note 82, at 729
(arguing that if a court is not persuaded by an agency's construction of an ambiguous statutory provision, the court should remand the matter back to the agency where the agency is a party rather than simply deciding the matter for itself).
160 Giving an agency two chances to articulate its views--once as a litigant and
then again on remand-could give the agency a significant and arguably unfair litigating advantage.
161 When a court decides to refer a matter to an agency pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine,

the referral "does not deprive the court of jurisdiction." Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993).
Rather, the court either may retain jurisdiction while the agency decides the matter, or it may dismiss the
case without prejudice. Id. at 268-69. In this sense, the primary jurisdiction doctrine operates in a similar fashion to some of the abstention doctrines utilized in the federalism context that allow a federal
court to stay or dismiss its proceedings pending resolution of an issue by the state courts.
162 See generally Sidney A. Shapiro, Abstention and PrimaryJurisdiction: Two Chips Off
the Same
Block?-A Comparative Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75 (1975) (noting similarities between abstention and primary jurisdiction).
163 Syntek Semiconductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 285 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2002); TCG
N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2002); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury
Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 580-81 & n.1 (1 st Cir. 1979); see also RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 14.1, at 917 (4th ed. 2002); Duffy, supranote 150, at 141.
164 U.S. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Al. Salmon of Maine, 339 F.3d 23, 34 (1st Cir. 2003);
see
also Nat'l Republican Cong. Comm. v. Legi-Tech. Corp., 795 F.2d 190, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
165 See Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 580 n.I; Syntek Semiconductor Co., 285 F.3d at 862. But see
Louis L. Jaffe, PrimaryJurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (1964) ("Primary jurisdiction is pro
tanto exclusive jurisdiction; insofar as the agency has jurisdiction it excludes the courts.").
166 Syntek Semiconductor Co., 285 F.3d at 862 (quoting Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs.,
Inc., 277 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also New Eng. Legal Found. v. Mass. Port Auth., 883
F.2d 157, 171 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Whenever both the courts and an administrative agency appear to have
jurisdiction over a particular controversy, the question arises as to which forum should speak first on the
matter.").
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There is "no fixed formula" that courts apply when deciding whether
or not primary jurisdiction should be invoked.'67 Rather, courts generally
analyze a variety of factors, including whether the agency determination
lies at the heart of the task assigned to the agency, whether agency expertise
is required to resolve the question, and whether a determination from the
agency would materially aid the court.'68 Courts also may consider whether
"the goal of national uniformity in the interpretation and application of a
federal regulatory regime" would be furthered by permitting the agency to
take a first look at the problem.'6 9 In addition, courts may consider whether
referral to the agency would help "to avoid the possibility that a court's ruling might disturb or disrupt the regulatory regime of the agency in question."' 0
Both Chevron and primary jurisdiction aim to further similar values,
including agency expertise and national uniformity.'
A few courts, accordingly, have recognized the potential interplay between Chevron and
primary jurisdiction. 7 In American Automobile ManufacturersAssociation
v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection,' for example,
the First Circuit explained that "[w]hen the matter at issue is primarily one
of statutory interpretation, referral of that matter to the agency with primary
jurisdiction may also be generally advisable in precisely those circumstances in which a court would defer to the agency's interpretation pursuant
to Chevron."'74

See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
Am. Auto. Mfr. Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 1998); see also
New Eng. Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 172.
169 Am. Auto. Mfr. Ass'n, 163 F.3d at 81; see also TCG N.Y., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d
67, 74 (2d Cir. 2002); New Eng. Legal Found., 883 F.2d at 175; Kiefer v. Paging Network, Inc., 50 F.
Supp. 2d 681, 683-84 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
170 Am Auto. Mfr. Ass'n, 163 F.3d at 81.
171 See David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative Rules,
17
167
168

YALE J. ON REG. 327, 359 (2000).
172 See, e.g., In re StarNet, Inc.,

355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004) (invoking primary jurisdiction
doctrine where agency's views, although they would ultimately be subject to review by the judiciary for
reasonableness under Chevron, would be the "logical place for the judiciary to start"); Nw. Airlines, Inc.
v. County of Kent, Mich., 510 U.S. 355, 366-67 & n.10 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that because the Court
lacked an agency view to which it could grant Chevron deference, referral pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine might have been appropriate if the parties had briefed or argued the question); Nat'l Republican Cong. Comm. v. Legi-Tech Corp., 795 F.2d 190, 193-94 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (noting the
relationship between the primary jurisdiction doctrine and Chevron); Kiefer, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 686
("Additional support for invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine can be gleaned from the Supreme
Court's decision in Chevron ... .
173 163 F.3d 74.
174 Id. at 81. The First Circuit in that case ultimately determined that the case should be referred to
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to allow the EPA to provide a uniform and nationallyapplicable answer to the unresolved statutory issues facing the court. Id. at 85-86. The First Circuit,
however, subsequently concluded that its referral to the EPA was "not a wise one" because it turned out
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A recent Seventh Circuit decision authored by Judge Easterbrook, In re
StarNet, Inc., ' provides another good example. In that case, the Seventh
Circuit faced an ambiguous provision in the 1996 Telecommunications Act
and its implementing regulations: the term "location."' 76 Judge Easter-

brook explained that "[i nstead of trying to divine how the FCC would resolve the ambiguity created by the word 'location,"' the court thought "it
best to send this matter to the Commission under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction."' 77 The court noted that "[o]nly the FCC can disambiguate the
word 'location'; all we could do would be to make an educated guess." '78
Although the court acknowledged that any views obtained from the FCC ultimately would be subject to review by the court for reasonableness (presumably under Chevron), the court determined that the agency's views
nonetheless would be the "logical place for the judiciary to start."' 7 9
Despite the potential for interplay between primary jurisdiction and
Chevron, primary jurisdiction has received relatively little attention from either the courts or scholars since the Court handed down Chevron.t 0 The
current editions of various leading administrative law casebooks, for example, devote no more than a few pages, if that, to the primary jurisdiction
doctrine.' In addition, although the Supreme Court has hinted at the rela-

that the EPA "was not in a position to [authoritatively] determine" any of the issues referred to it. Ass'n
of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Comm'r, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2000).
175 355 F.3d 634.
176 Id. at 639.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.

180 This is not to say that no attention has been given to the intersection between Chevron and primary jurisdiction. Some scholars have noted the parallel. For example, prior to BrandX being decided,
a few scholars considered whether the primary jurisdiction doctrine could prove useful in cases where
issues of unresolved statutory ambiguity are involved. See Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1309-10; Polsky, supra note 29, at 206 n. 121. Those scholars that have considered the relationship between Chevron
and primary jurisdiction, however, generally have been dismissive of the doctrine. See Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1309-10 (rejecting the notion that widespread use of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
could provide a solution to the ossification problem posed by Mead); Polsky, supra note 29, at 206
n. 121 (arguing that the primary jurisdiction would not prove useful in the tax context). The one notable
exception is provided by Richard J. Pierce, who devotes significant attention to the utility of the doctrine
in his treatise. See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE II, § 14.3, at 941 (4th ed.
2002) (arguing that "[o]ne of the many effects of Chevron is to increase the number of cases in which
courts should refer issues to agencies under the primary jurisdiction doctrine").
181 See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 911-12 (3d ed. 2001) (including two short
paragraphs on the primary jurisdiction doctrine); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 432-36 (2d ed. 2001) (providing just over four pages of materials on the primary
jurisdiction doctrine); PETER L. STRAUSS, TODD D. RAKOFF & CYNTHIA R. FARINA, GELLHORN &
BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASES AND COMMENTS 1243-45 (rev. 10th ed. 2003) (devoting less than
two pages to the topic). But see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 212-23 (4th ed. 2004) (providing twelve pages of materials on the

primary jurisdiction doctrine).
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tionship between the two doctrines,182 it has not applied primary jurisdiction
to a case of statutory ambiguity since Chevron."3
Now that Brand X makes clear that judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions may merely serve as interim constructions, there
are good grounds for arguing that the primary jurisdiction doctrine should
be revitalized. Primary jurisdiction stands as a potentially useful tool to allow courts to adapt to their newly reduced role in the interpretive process
post-BrandX. In particular, by invoking primary jurisdiction where there is
unresolved statutory ambiguity that would affect the court's resolution of
the case, the courts can obtain agency views prior to independently issuing
a statutory construction-thereby minimizing the likelihood of agency
overrides or interbranch conflict, reducing those situations where the courts
will have to engage in policymaking to resolve statutory ambiguity, and furthering uniformity in the law.'84
Imagine, for example, a suit between two private parties filed in federal
district court that turns on the meaning of an ambiguous term in a statute
that the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has been charged
with interpreting. If the SEC has yet to interpret the ambiguous statutory
term, the court could go ahead and impose its own independent construction
on the statute (an interim construction that the SEC could later overturn using Brand X). Or the court-invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrinecould stay its proceedings and defer any decision in the action until the SEC
has addressed the meaning of the ambiguous statutory term, for example, by
issuing a substantive rule or a declaratory ruling.'85 Taking the latter approach would enable the court not only to draw on the agency's expertise
but also would promote uniformity and accuracy.
Of course, much like abstention, which is used relatively sparingly in
the federalism context, the benefits of primary jurisdiction will not always
outweigh the costs of invoking the doctrine. In deciding whether primary
jurisdiction will prove fruitful in a particular case, the courts will need to
weigh several limiting aspects of the doctrine. First, "referral" pursuant to
182 See Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent Mich., 510 U.S. 355, 366-67 & n.10 (1994) (noting
that because the Court was lacking an agency view to which it could grant Chevron deference, referral
pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine might have been appropriate if the parties had briefed or
argued the question); see also Pharm. Res. & Manuf. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 672-73 (2003)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
183 See generally Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1309 (noting that the Court has "recently confirmed
the vitality of the traditional doctrine of 'primary jurisdiction,' though it has not applied the doctrine
since before the Chevron decision.").
184Cf Nat'l Republican Cong. Comm. v. Legi-Tech Corp., 795 F.2d 190, 193-94 & n.7 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (noting that by invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the court could avoid having to construe the statute prior to the agency doing so and thus could eliminate the "untoward" possibility that the
agency subsequently would reject the court's interpretation).
185In invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the federal court would not be asking the parties to
bring their action before the agency instead but rather the court merely would stay the federal case to
allow the parties to seek out the agency's views on the discrete issue of statutory ambiguity.
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primary jurisdiction will not guarantee a Chevron-eligibledetermination (or
any determination, for that matter) from the relevant agency. This is because most regulatory statutes "contain[] no mechanism whereby a court
can on its own authority demand or request a determination from the
agency."' 86 Rather, "a court invokes the doctrine of primary jurisdiction by
staying its proceedings to allow one of the parties to file an administrative
complaint seeking resolution of a particular issue."' 87 The success of a referral of a case to an agency, therefore, rests in the hands of the parties, as
well as the relevant agency, which must demonstrate a willingness to respond to a court's invitation for assistance. 8
This aspect of primary jurisdiction, however, should not significantly
detract from the utility of the doctrine as an interactive tool. Even though
courts generally lack the statutory authority to force a recalcitrant agency

into action,'89 agencies have shown a general willingness to decide matters
premised on a referral pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The Interstate Commerce Commission, for example, once noted that "petitions for
issuance of a declaratory order premised on referral from a court are granted
routinely."' 9

Similarly, the Food and Drug Administration has expressed a

desire to be able to make "the initial determination on issues within its
statutory mandate," even when that may mean having a court dismiss or
hold in abeyance judicial proceedings before it. 9 '

Accordingly, there is

reason to expect that agencies will demonstrate a general willingness to respond to judicial referrals.
A second limiting aspect of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is that the
doctrine generally will not apply where one of the parties before the court is
the agency to which the matter would be referred.'92 Although this narrows

the applicability of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it does not detract
from the benefits that could flow from invoking the doctrine in those cases
where the agency is not a party to the case before the court.' 93 After all, if
186

Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Palmer-Foundry, Inc. v.

Delta-Ha, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 110, 113 (D. Mass. 2004); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Dominican Comm.
Corp., 984 F. Supp. 185, 189 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
187 Palmer-Foundry,Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d at 113.
188 Cf Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 & n.3 (1993).
189 Cf Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64-65 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that
5 U.S.C. § 706(1) can be used to require agency action only where an agency has "failed to take a discrete agency action that it is requiredto take").
190 Union Pacific Railroad Co. Petition for Declaratory Order, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,106-07 (June 15,
1993).
191 21 C.F.R. § 10.25(b) (1989).
192 See Commonwealth of Mass. v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 992 n.14 (lst Cir.
1995); U.S. v. Elrod, 627 F.2d 813, 817-18 (7th Cir. 1980); Austin Lakes Joint Venture v. Avon Utilities, Inc., 648 N.E.2d 641,648 (Ind. 1995).
193 See, e.g., Kiefer v. Paging Network, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 681, 683-86 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (invoking primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of a suit brought against a paging service provider by a
customer); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Dominican Comm. Corp., 984 F. Supp. 185, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y.
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the agency is a party to the case before the court, then the agency will be
"present before the court to lend whatever accumulated special expertise it
may possess,"'94 and the courts will not need to rely on any interactive tools
to solicit agency views.' 95
A third potentially limiting aspect of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
is its tendency to add to litigation costs and to create delay.' 96 Much like the
various abstention doctrines used in the federalism context, invocation of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine may create additional costs and delay because the parties must initiate proceedings before the relevant agency and
then return to federal court at the conclusion of the agency's proceedings.' 97
If an agency merely issues an informal ruling, such as an advisory opinion
or an interpretive rule, in response to a referral, then the agency might act
relatively quickly and thereby minimize any delay. However, if the agency
1997) (considering referral pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of suit brought by
a telephone interexchange carrier against long-distance telephone service resellers); Doe v. Anrig, 500 F.
Supp. 802, 8 10-11 (D. Mass. 1980) (asking parties to consider whether the primary jurisdiction doctrine
might be used to solicit the participation of the Department of Education).
194 U.S. v. Elrod, 627 F.2d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Massachusetts v. Blackstone
Valley
Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 992 n.14 (1st Cir. 1995).
195See supra note 165 and accompanying
text.
196 In addition to creating delay, an agency's decision to issue a legislative
rule pursuant to section
553 might raise questions about whether the rule could then be given retroactive effect. See Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988). The Court's decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996), however, seems to resolve any such questions-making clear that no
retroactivity problem would arise if an agency promulgated a regulation to resolve statutory ambiguity
raised in an adjudication involving private parties. Id. In Smiley, a credit card holder brought suit
against a bank, alleging that the bank charged excessive late fees on her account. Id. at 737-38. After
the California Superior Court dismissed the suit and the California Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, the Comptroller of the Currency decided to eliminate uncertainty and confusion surrounding the
meaning of the term "interest" in the National Bank Act, and it adopted a regulation interpreting the
term. Id. at 738-39. On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the litigation in the Smiley case
itself helped prompt the Comptroller to promulgate the regulation but it nonetheless deferred to the
Comptroller's interpretation under Chevron. Id. at 740-41. The Court made clear that doing so did not
raise a retroactivity problem in violation of Bowen. Id. at 744 n.3. Specifically, the Court explained:
"There might be substance to [a retroactivity argument] if the regulation replaced a prior agency interpretation .... Where, however, a court is addressing transactions that occurred at a time when there was
no clear agency guidance, it would be absurd to ignore the agency's current authoritative pronouncement of what the statute means." Id. at 744 n.3. In other words, if a rule simply clarifies legal principles
that were in effect when the complained of conduct occurred, application of the rule cannot be viewed as
impermissibly retroactive.
197 Adding to potential delay is the possibility that a decision rendered by an agency upon
a referral
will be appealed to another court before the federal district court can resume proceedings in the initial
case. See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1987) ("Where .. .a
district court refers a case to an agency under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and exclusive authority
to review the agency's determination is granted to a court other than the referring district court, the district court is bound by determinations made in the collateral administrative proceedings and may not itself review the merits of the agency's decision."); see also Narragansett Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 407 F.3d 1,
5, n.3 (Ist Cir. 2005); Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 196 F.3d 302, 305
n.l (lst Cir. 1999).
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elects to promulgate a more formal interpretation in order to obtain Chevron
deference-such as a notice-and-comment rule' 98 or a declaratory ruling issued after soliciting public comments' 99 -then the delay could be substantial.2"'
Concerns about the possibility of delay and added costs, however,
should not lead courts to dismiss the utility of primary jurisdiction entirely.
In some cases, the prejudice the parties may endure while being forced to
wait for an agency determination may be minimized by the court. In Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Electric Co.,2"' for example, the First Circuit ensured that the plaintiffs interest in recovering $5.8
million that it spent cleaning up a waste site would be protected while the
federal case was held in abeyance by requiring the defendant to place $5.8
million into an interest bearing escrow account.0 2
Similarly, in invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine to allow the
2 3 the Seventh
FCC to "disambiguate" the meaning of the term "location,""
Circuit in In re StarNet took care to restore the parties to their original positions in order to minimize any prejudice while waiting for the FCC to re198 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2000) (setting forth procedures for agency rulemaking).
199 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (2000) (empowering agencies to issue declaratory orders to "terminate a
controversy or remove uncertainty"); see also City of Chicago v. FCC, 199 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir.
1999) (determining that Chevron deference can be given to an agency's declaratory ruling); Jeffrey S.
Lubbers and Blake D. Morant, A Reexamination of Federal Agency Use of Declaratory Orders, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1097, 1118-19 (2004) (noting that an agency's decision to issue a declaratory ruling
may "raise lingering questions regarding" entitlement to Chevron deference).
200 The First Circuit's experience in Massachusettsv. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981 (1st
Cir. 1995), provides a dramatic illustration of the substantial delay that can result from invocation of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine. In that case, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sued the Blackstone
Valley Electric Co. to recover $5.8 million in response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Id. at 983. The primary dispute in the case
turned on the question of whether ferric ferrocyanide constitutes a "hazardous substance" within the
meaning of CERCLA. Id. at 984. Because neither CERCLA itself nor regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") clearly resolved the question, the First Circuit determined that the
matter should be referred to the EPA. Id. at 993. In justifying its decision to refer the matter to the
EPA, the First Circuit explained that it "believe[d] it better to have the EPA resolve the issue nationwide" rather than "leave this matter to the risk of inconsistent outcomes before particular courts in different parts of the country." Id. at 992-93. Although the First Circuit issued its order calling for referral
pursuant to the primary jurisdiction doctrine on October 6, 1995, it was not until January 25, 2001, that
the EPA issued a preliminary administrative determination describing its opinion on the matter and welcoming public comments. See Preliminary Administrative Determination Document on the Question of
Whether Ferric Ferrocyanide Is One of the "Cyanides" Within the Meaning of the List of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 7759 (Jan. 25, 2001). And it was not until October 6,
2003-eight years after the First Circuit decided that referral was appropriate-before the EPA issued a
final administrative determination in the matter. See Final Administrative Determination Document on
the Question of Whether Ferric Ferrocyanide Is One of the "Cyanides" Within the Meaning of the List
of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 68 Fed. Reg. 57,690 (Oct. 6, 2003).
201 67 F.3d 981.
202 Id. at993 n.16.

203 In re Stamet, 355 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2004).
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solve the dispute.204 Judge Easterbrook explained that by restoring the parties to their original position pending a decision from the FCC, the court
could "curtail[] the losses to which [one party] was exposed without prospect of reimbursement, while protecting [the other party's] interest in receiving prices and terms offered by the current competitive market.""2 5 The
Seventh Circuit, accordingly, sought the FCC's assistance while minimizing any potential prejudice to the parties.
In addition to ensuring that primary jurisdiction will be invoked only
where the parties will not be significantly prejudiced, courts also can take
steps to try to minimize any delay that might result. Courts, for example,
could stay their proceedings for a specified amount of time.20 6 If the relevant agency fails to act within the timeframe set by the court, then the court
may go ahead without the agency's guidance. This was the approach taken
by the First Circuit in American Automobile Manufacturers Association v.
Massachusetts Department of EnvironmentalProtection."7 In that case, the
court stayed federal proceedings for 180 days to afford the defendant "a
reasonable opportunity to obtain a ruling from the EPA."2 8 Because such
an approach helps to define the amount of permissible delay at the outset, it
could provide courts with a useful means of alleviating concern about having to wait indefinitely for agency action.0 9
In short, primary jurisdiction cannot serve as an across-the-board solution to the problems posed by BrandX given that invocation of the doctrine
may create undue delay and will not always result in a determination from
an agency. Nonetheless, the primary jurisdiction doctrine may prove useful
in certain cases-namely, those cases where an unresolved issue of statutory ambiguity that can only be authoritatively construed by a Chevron eligible agency would impact the federal court's resolution of the case and
where any resulting delay will not significantly prejudice the parties.2"'
Courts should not, accordingly, dismiss primary jurisdiction as a relic of the
past. Rather, as courts adapt to their newly reduced role in the interpretive
process post-BrandX, primary jurisdiction should be kept in mind as a potentially useful interactive tool.

204 ld. at 639-40.

Id. at 640.
206 See, e.g., Am. Auto. Mfrs Ass'n v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 163 F.3d 74, 86-87 (1st Cir.
205

1998); Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1988).
207 163 F.3d at 86-87.
208 Id.
at 86.
209 A slightly different approach was taken by the district court in Palmer Foundry, Inc. v. DeltaHa, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D. Mass. 2004). In that case, the district court ensured that it could monitor the progress being made pursuant to the referral by ordering the parties to submit status reports to the
court every ninety days. Id. at 114-15.
210 Cf Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51 (1976) (noting in the federalism context that the propriety of abstention is limited by considerations of delay and expense).
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2. Inviting Amicus Curiae Briefs.-A second and even more promising interactive tool involves the practice of inviting agencies to file amicus
curiae briefs." Just as state certification procedures in the federalism context "reduce[s] the substantial burdens of cost and delay that abstention
places on litigants,"2 2 the practice of inviting agency amicus briefs in the
administrative law context may help to avoid concerns about the cost and
delay of relying on primary jurisdiction.213 This is because amicus briefs
present the informal views of the agency and thus do not require the agency
to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking or other time consuming
procedures. Inviting an agency to file an amicus brief, therefore, could be
particularly appropriate where a court wants to expeditiously solicit the
views of an agency that has not previously set forth any views whatsoever,
or where the court needs clarification about an informal interpretation issued by the agency in the past.
At the Supreme Court level, the Court regularly invites agencies to file
amicus briefs through the Solicitor General of the United States." 4 The
lower federal courts also invite amicus briefs from federal agencies from
time to time. 15 Nonetheless, some lower federal courts have expressed re211 See, e.g., Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315, 324 (3d Cir. 1989) (suggesting that district court

on remand may want to invite the views of the Department of Housing & Urban Development);
DeBraska v. City of Milwaukee, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 2000) ("At this court's invitation, the Secretary of Labor has filed an amicus brief .. "),See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE II, § 14.6 (4th ed. 2002) (suggesting that rather than relying on the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, courts might "obtain the agency's analysis of an issue before the court...
by seeking an amicus brief from the agency").
212 City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,470 (1987).
213 Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Boston Gas Co., 693 F.2d 1113, 1119 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.)
("We think that [the relevant question] can be answered fully and quickly through amicus participation.
If more elaborate agency proceedings are required, the agency can so inform us."); see also TCG N.Y.,
Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Amicus briefs from an agency can serve
much of the interest in consistency and uniformity of law that underlies the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, while avoiding some of the delay that sometimes results from dismissing on the ground of primary
jurisdiction.").
214 See, e.g., Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 31, Texaco v.
Dagher, 126 S.Ct. 1276 (2006) (Nos. 04-805, 04-814) (brief submitted at the invitation of the Court by
the Acting Solicitor General and signed by the General Counsel of the FTC); Brief for the United States
As Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 1,29, Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)
(No. 03-932) (brief signed by Solicitor General and SEC submitted in response to invitation of the
Court); Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 1, 20, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544
U.S. 431 (2005) (No. 03-338) (brief signed by Solicitor General and EPA submitted in response to
Court's invitation); Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae at 1, 19, Entergy La., Inc. v. La. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, 539 U.S. 39 (2003) (No. 02-299) (brief filed in response to Court's invitation by Solicitor General and FERC).
215 See, e.g., Dabit v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 395 F.3d 25, 34 n.6 (2d Cir.
2005); Cvelbar v. CBI Ill. Inc., 106 F.3d 1368, 1373 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997); Harden v. Raffensperger,
Hughes & Co., Inc., 65 F.3d 1392 (7th Cir. 1995); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1140 (2d Cir. 1992); In re Network Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp.
2d 1017, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Country Aviation, Inc. v. Tinicum Twp., No. 92-3017, 1992 WL
396782, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1992).
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luctance about inviting agency amicus briefs.216 This reluctance has persisted even though the Supreme Court has encouraged the lower courts to
invite agency views on more than one occasion. In Mead v. Tilley,217 for
example, the Court remanded a case involving ERISA because neither the
agencies responsible for enforcing ERISA nor the Court of Appeals had
weighed in on an issue of statutory construction facing the Court. In remanding the case, the Court noted that it was "reluctant to address []complicated and important issues pertaining to the private pensions of millions
of workers" without having "the views of the agencies responsible for enforcing ERISA,"'21 and it advised the Court of Appeals that it "should consider the views of the [Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation] and the
[Internal Revenue Service]" on remand.219 The Court explained that "[flor a
court to attempt to answer these questions without the views of the agencies
responsible for enforcing ERISA, would be to 'embar[k] upon a voyage
without a compass.'"22
Similarly, in Rosado v. Wyman, the Court emphasized that
"[w]henever possible the district courts should obtain the views of' the
relevant federal agency where the agency has not already set forth its views
or where it is unclear how the agency's standards might apply.2 ' The Court
explained that just because an issue is an appropriate one for judicial resolution does not mean that "the courts must therefore deny themselves the
enlightenment which may be had from" obtaining and considering the
views of the relevant agency."22
Given the benefits that could flow from increased judicial willingness
to invite agency amicus briefs, an obvious question arises: why has the
practice of inviting amicus briefs remained relatively rare at the lower court
level? One explanation may be found in the Supreme Court's pronouncements that agency "litigating positions"--i.e., positions developed by agencies in the course of litigation and advanced as post hoc rationalizations to
216

See, e.g., Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv, Plan, 388 F.3d 570, 578 (7th Cir. 2004)

(considering inviting amicus brief from the Internal Revenue Service but declining to do so because of
"the great age of the case"); Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1970) (suggesting that district court "should go slow in accepting, and even slower in inviting, an amicus brief"); Cox v. AA
Check Cashiers Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 935, 936 n.1 (W.D. Ark. 2000) (refusing to invite the Federal Reserve Board to submit an amicus brief, noting that inviting amicus briefs is an "extraordinary" measure).
See generally 2 JOANNE D'ALCOMO ET AL., APPELLATE PRACTICE IN MASSACHUSETTS ch. 17 (2004)
(noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit rarely invites amicus briefs and that only
"[o]n a few occasions over the years, the First Circuit has requested an amicus brief from a particular
government agency on a particular issue").
217 490 U.S. 714, 726 (1989).
218 Id. at726 n.11.
219 Id. at726.
220 Id.
221 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970).
222 Id. at397 & n.9 (quoting Sw. Sugar & Molasses Co., Inc. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S.
411,420 (1959)).
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defend past agency action-do not deserve judicial deference. 23 These
pronouncements, however, have little bearing on the utility of agency
amicus briefs. Unlike a litigating position (which is developed by the
agency in the course of a particular case to which the agency is a party), an
agency's amicus views do not represent the agency's post hoc attempt to
defend its action as a litigant but rather may well "reflect the agency's fair
'
and considered judgment on the matter in question."224
A position set forth
in an amicus brief, therefore, should not be shunned simply because it
comes to the court in the form of a brief.225

A second potential hurdle standing in the way of increased reliance on
invited agency amicus briefs may be found in judicial concern that agency
amicus briefs merely represent the views of agency counsel rather than the
views of the agency head,226 or that they may be "developed hastily, or under special pressure, or without an adequate opportunity for presentation of
'
conflicting views."227
These concerns, however, easily can be overcome.
As the amicus experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") demonstrates, agencies can adopt internal operating procedures to
ensure the validity and quality of amicus briefs. The SEC, for example, requires that the entire Commission review and approve the positions taken in
SEC amicus briefs prior to the briefs being filed. 28 This ensures that positions taken in the SEC's amicus briefs "are not simply the work of the
'
Commission's counsel" but rather "are the Commission's views." 229
The

SEC also generally offers parties an opportunity to meet with agency officials to discuss the case while the SEC formulates its amicus position-

thereby ensuring that amicus positions are not formulated without the opportunity for the presentation of conflicting views. 3 ° In addition, the SEC
has centralized its brief drafting process in one office to assure "that it will
223 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988) ("Deference to what
appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.").
224 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997); see also Hertzberg v. Dignity Partners, Inc., 191

F.3d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir. 1999).
225 Auer, 519 U.S. at 462.
226 See, e.g., Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 993-94 (7th Cir. 2003) ("It is odd to think of agencies
as making law by means of statements made in briefs, since agency briefs, at least below the Supreme
Court level, normally are not reviewed by the members of the agency itself."); Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.
v. Milwaukee Brewery Workers' Pension Plan, 3 F.3d 994, 1003 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Only the agency, not
its lawyers, exercises delegated power. Did that brief articulate the policy of the agency, or was it a concoction of appellate counsel?") (citation omitted); Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury,
Fin. Mgmt. Serv., 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting concern that agency amicus briefs
sometimes "may not reflect the views of the agency head(s)").
227 Fed. Labor RelationsAuth., 884 F.2d at 1455.
228 See Ruder, supra note 22, at 1180; see also Prezioso, supra note 22.
229 Ruder, supra note 22, at 1180; see also Prezioso, supra note 22 ("Unlike staff statements, interpretative guidance and no-action letters, amicus briefs reflect the views of the Commission.").
230 See Prezioso, supra note 22.
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be making the same arguments in the Seventh Circuit that it makes in the
Second or Ninth. '23 1 These relatively simple operating procedures, if
adopted and followed by other agencies, could help to eliminate concerns
that agency counsel will act as "'mavericks disembodied from the agency
that they represent' in filing amicus briefs.232
In addition, the courts themselves could help to minimize concerns that
agency amicus briefs will be developed hastily by providing agencies with
sufficient time to file thorough and well-considered amicus briefs. Giving
agencies adequate time to draft well-considered briefs may delay a case
slightly, but the cost of waiting is not great considering the benefits of enabling the court to obtain the agency's expert views on an issue of statutory
interpretation that falls within the agency's delegated lawmaking sphere. 33
Moreover, concern that some agency views expressed through amicus briefs
may be poorly considered or hastily drafted is not a valid ground for dismissing the usefulness of amicus briefs entirely.2
Rather, concern about
the validity or thoroughness of agency briefs should be addressed on a caseby-case basis when determining how much weight a court should give
to a
235
particular agency amicus brief when construing statutory ambiguity.
A final potential hurdle standing in the way of increased reliance on
agency amicus briefs is the courts' current inability to demand that agencies
respond to their invitations to file amicus briefs. As in the primary jurisdiction context, most regulatory statutes contain no mechanism enabling the

231
232

Ruder, supra note 22, at 1180.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (en banc) (Silberman, J., concurring)).
233 Cf Barry Friedman, Under the Law of FederalJurisdiction: Allocating Cases
Between Federal
and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1211, 1255-56 (2004) (noting that in the federalism context,
state certification may create some delay and added expense, "but not a great deal, especially considering the benefits of obtaining an authoritative ruling"); Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A Valuable Process in Need of Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125, 128 (1992) ("Even if
certification actions become somewhat slowed during the process, this seems a small price for correct
resolution of the matter. Courts should be placing a premium on deciding cases well, not just quickly.").
234 Cf Huggins v. Isenbarger, 798 F.2d 203, 208 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
("Some views expressed in briefs may be poorly considered, but some views expressed in judicial opinions also are poorly considered.").
235 The federal courts are not required to accept the views set forth in an agency amicus brief pursuant to Chevron. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000); Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir. 2001). But see Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 462 (1997). Agency amicus briefs, however, may nonetheless be given appropriate weight
pursuant to Skidmore based on their power to persuade. See Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944); Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 365 (4th Cir. 2000); see also infra Part IV.B.
For example, a brief that thoroughly describes the agency's position and explains the agency's reasoning
would have greater persuasive value than one that simply arrives at a conclusion without providing support for the agency's reading of the statute.
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courts to order a determination from an agency.236 Thus, whether or not an
agency decides to respond to a judicial invitation for an amicus brief likely
will turn on a variety of factors,237 ranging from political and strategic considerations to logistical considerations, such as the agency's workload and
whether the agency would need to obtain the consent of the Department of
Justice before filing a brief. 3 If an agency flatly refuses to accept a judicial
invitation to file an amicus brief, the agency would be placed in the unpleasant situation of telling the court no, and the court might feel awkward
about having to resolve the issue on its own after previously having decided
that the agency's views were needed.239 This means that in order to turn
amicus briefs into a useful interactive tool, not only would judges need to
become increasingly willing to invite amicus briefs, but agencies also
would have to become increasingly willing to respond.
Agencies, of course, could demonstrate their willingness to respond to
amicus invitations by voluntarily adopting rules governing the amicus process. These rules could borrow from procedural rules that agencies have
adopted to govern the issuance of advisory opinions,24 ° as well as from state
236

Cf Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 n.3 (1993) (noting that most regulatory statutes "con-

tain[] no mechanism whereby a court can on its own authority demand" an agency determination).
237 See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 407 (1970) (noting that the district court explored the
possibility of having the Department of Health, Education & Welfare participate in the case as an
amicus but that the "Department at that stage determined to remain aloof"); Echazabal v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 213 F.3d 1098, 1104 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was invited to file brief but declined to do so); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 1138, 1140-41 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that agency declined to file amicus
brief because "the need to fully consider all of the implications of these issues within the Department
precludes our providing the Court with a brief within a foreseeable time frame"); Popkin v. Bishop, 464
F.2d 714, 719 n.15 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that the SEC declined the court's invitation to file an amicus
brief "due to the inability of the Commissioners to agree upon a position"); Burgess v. Garvin, No. 01
Civ. 10994 (GEL), 2004 WL 527053, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2004) ("The Department of Justice
declined this Court's invitation to provide an amicus brief on the issue; the Court therefore reaches its
conclusions without the benefit of input from the agency charged with implementing the [statute].");
Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 155 n.16 (D. Mass. 1988), affd 883 F.2d 1114 (1st
Cir. 1989) (noting that SEC declined invitation to file an amicus brief and recognizing that "various prudential and strategic considerations, including an interest in permitting the case law to ripen and a desire
not to become committed even indirectly on an issue as yet unresolved within the agency[] may govern
the decision whether to file an amicus brief").
238 See Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 970 F.2d at 1140 (noting that agency requested additional
time to file amicus brief because "approval of the Department of Justice was required"); Neal Devins,
Unitarinessand Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL.
L. REv. 255, 263-64 (1994) (discussing the power of the Department of Justice, under the direction of
the Attorney General, to control aspects of agency litigation).
239 Cf Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67, 99 (2d Cir. 2000) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (noting in
the state certification context that a state court's task of refusing to answer a certified question is "obviously unpleasant"); Kaye & Weissman, supra note 25, at 408-09 (discussing problems that can arise
when a state court refuses a federal court's certification request).
240 See, e.g., II C.F.R. §§ 112.1-112.4 (2006) (setting forth the Federal Election Commission's
procedural rules governing when the agency will respond to requests for advisory opinions); 16 C.F.R.
§ 1.1 (2006) (setting forth the Federal Trade Commission's procedural rules governing when the agency
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laws allowing state courts to answer certified questions from the federal
courts.24' If agencies willingly adopt such procedural rules, the rules could
help to define what factors an agency will take into account when deciding
whether to respond to a judicial invitation and what procedural safeguards
the agency will follow to ensure that any amicus positions are not only well
considered but also representative of the views of the agency as a whole.242
Even in the absence of such rules, however, there is reason to expect
that agencies generally would respond favorably to increased judicial invitations for assistance. Most notably, if an agency refuses to provide a court
with its views and the court ultimately adopts a construction that the agency
disagrees with, then the agency will have to expend considerable time and
money engaging in notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication
if it wants to overturn the court's ruling.243 This is because Brand X indicates that an agency only can trump a court's own independent reading of a
statute by promulgating a Chevron-eligible interpretation. 2" And Christensen and Mead hold that Chevron generally will apply only to binding interpretations, such as interpretations involving notice-and-comment
rulemaking or formal adjudication.24 Agencies, therefore, may well have
an incentive in light of Brand X to expend a relatively small amount of time
and money responding to a court's request for an amicus brief in order to
decrease the likelihood of having to expend considerably more time and
money later on.246
Further diffusing concerns that agencies will thwart judicial attempts to
solicit agency amicus briefs is the fact that non-parties in other analogous
contexts frequently cooperate with judicial requests for assistance. In the
federalism context, for example, state courts often agree to answer ques-

will respond to requests for advisory opinions); 16 C.F.R. § 1000.7 (2006) (setting forth procedural rules
governing when the Consumer Product Safety Commission will respond to requests for advisory opinions).
241 The language used in various state certification statutes could be instructive in terms of the language that agencies could adopt in drafting internal rules to govern agency's responses to judicial invitations to file amicus briefs. Most state statutes governing certification, for example, require that the
question certified be "determinative" or that it "may be determinative" of the litigation. See GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 137, at 18-19.
242 Cf. Prezioso, supra note 22 (noting the need for the SEC to better inform litigants, judges and
academics of the process the SEC uses in making amicus recommendations).
243 In other words, agencies might actually have an incentive to file an informal amicus brief because doing so could enable them to avoid engaging in time-consuming notice-and-comment procedures
in the first place. See infra notes 290-94 and accompanying text.
244 Nat'l Cable Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-83 (2005).
245 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
246 It is possible that instead of expending time and money to promulgate a Chevron-eligible interpretation to undo a judicial construction with which it disagrees, an agency might instead simply choose
not to acquiesce in the court's construction. See generally Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 120.
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tions certified to them by the federal courts, 47 even though the federal
courts cannot compel the state courts to answer certified questions.248 Similarly, in the context of litigation before the United States Supreme Court,
when the Court issues orders inviting the views of the Solicitor General, the
Solicitor General responds.249 Thus, there is reason to expect that agencies
generally will cooperate with courts' requests for assistance.
In sum, inviting agency amicus briefs can enable the courts to obtain
expert agency views in a relatively cost effective and expeditious manner.
The practice of inviting amicus briefs, accordingly, stands as a significant
interactive tool that the courts should become increasingly willing to utilize
post-BrandX. In addition, the power of the tool could be increased if agen-

cies-drawing on state certification procedures used in the federalism context-promulgate rules to govern the process of responding to amicus
invitations.
B. ReconceptualizingSkidmore
If courts actively solicit agency views through the primary jurisdiction
doctrine or by inviting agency amicus briefs, courts should be able to minimize those situations where they must construe statutory provisions in the
absence of any agency views whatsoever. Merely soliciting an agency's
views, however, will not always enable courts to entirely avoid the task of
wading into questions of ambiguous regulatory law. This is becauseunlike the binding views of a state's highest court solicited using state certi-

247

See

GOLDSCHMIDT,

supra note 137, at 46 (noting that state court justices who were surveyed

were "overwhelmingly positive toward certification, with 85 [justices] (80%) stating their courts were
either 'willing' or 'very willing' to answer questions certified to them and only 10 (10%) indicating their
courts were either 'somewhat reluctant' or 'very reluctant' to answer certified questions"); see also id. at
34 (listing data showing that "states are generally not reluctant to answer certified questions").
248 See Peter Jeremy Smith, The Anticommandeering Principle and Congress's Power to Direct
State JudicialAction: Congress's Power to Compel State Courts to Answer Certified Questions of State
Law, 31 CONN. L. REv. 649, 653 (1999) ("[A]II state certification procedures give the state court discretion in deciding whether to answer a certified question, even after the certification provision's prerequisites have been met.").
249 See supra note 214; see also Tony Mauro, SG's Office Becoming a Good Friend of the Court,
THE RECORDER, May 22, 2003, at 3 (noting that when the Solicitor General's office is "invited" to file a
brief with the Court, the Solicitor General views the invitation more as an order and will not decline to
respond). Perhaps the Solicitor General's willingness to respond to the Court's invitations can be explained by the fact that the Solicitor General is a repeat player before the Court and thus has an incentive
to comply with the Court's invitations. Because federal agencies are not necessarily repeat players before the same lower federal courts, this same incentive may not apply where an agency is invited by a
lower court to file an amicus brief. Nonetheless, at least one federal agency has expressed a policy of
trying to respond not only to requests from the Supreme Court but also "to virtually all [requests for
amicus briefs] received from the courts of appeals where the securities laws are believed to be dispositive of the issue presented." Ruder, supra note 22, at 1176 & n.39; see also Prezioso, supra note 22
(noting that the SEC "virtually always" honors court requests for amicus briefs).
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fication procedures in the federalism context 25°-agency views solicited by
a federal court in the context of a particular case often will be set forth in an
informal format, such as an amicus brief or an advisory opinion, ineligible
for Chevron's rule of mandatory deference.2 1' A true shift away from the
independent interpretive approach and toward an interactive approach in the
administrative realm, accordingly, would require more than merely a judicial willingness to solicit agency views. The federal courts also would be
required to take a second step: they would need to give teeth to Skidmore's
discretionary deference doctrine so that any non-binding agency views solicited during the course of a particular case receive due consideration.
Currently, the courts take diverging approaches when it comes to determining how much weight, if any, courts should give to an agency's nonbinding views pursuant to Skidmore.252 One approach, which the Supreme
Court appears to have embraced in Christensen v. Harris County, 53 in-

volves having the reviewing court take the agency's interpretation into ac-

250

See, e.g., Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 719 (6th Cir. 1994) ("A federal court that certi-

fies a question of state law should not be free to treat the answer as merely advisory unless the state
court specifically contemplates that result."); Sifers v. Gen. Marine Catering Co., 892 F.2d 386, 391 (5th
Cir. 1990) ("Ordinarily, a state court's answer to a certified question is final and binding upon the parties
between whom the issue arose."); Robbins, supra note 233, at 130 ("On the federal-to-state level, the
answer of the state's highest court binds all federal courts, and thus cannot be overturned even if an appeal occurs in the federal case.").
251 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (stating that interpretations that
"lack the force of law" do not warrant Chevron deference); Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d
360, 365 (4th Cir. 2000) (noting that positions taken in briefs during litigation are entitled only to
Skidmore deference). But see Jones v. Am. Postal Workers Union, Nat'l, 192 F.3d 417, 427 (4th Cir.
1999) (according Chevron deference to an agency's amicus brief).
252 Some lower federal courts, for example, have attempted to apply Skidmore's totality-of-thecircumstances test by giving weight to an agency's informal views only when the agency's views are
found to be "persuasive" and giving no weight where the agency's views are found unpersuasive. See,
e.g., Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2005); St. Mary's Hosp. of Rochester v. Leavitt, 416 F.3d 906, 914 (8th Cir. 2005); Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 191 (2d
Cir. 2005); In re New Times Sec. Servs., Inc., 371 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2004). In contrast, other lower
federal courts-faced with uncertainty about Skidmore's exact meaning-have tried to duck Skidmore
entirely, concluding that they would reach the same result regardless of the amount of weight given to
the relevant agency's views. See, e.g., Nevada v. Dep't of Energy, 400 F.3d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
SouthCo, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286, n.5 (3d Cir. 2004); Fed. Trade Comm'n v.
Garvey, 383 F.3d 891, 903-04 (9th Cir. 2004); McCormick ex rel. McCormick v. School Dist. of
Mamaroneck, 370 F.3d 275, 290 (2d Cir. 2004); Wildermuth, supra note 57, at 1897 (describing how
some courts "have simply decided not to engage in the analysis where they would reach the same conclusion as the agency").
253 In Christensen v. HarrisCounty, 529 U.S. 576 (2000), the Court applied Skidmore in the context
of a dispute that arose over the meaning of the term "compensatory time" found in the Fair Labor Standards Act. In addressing the issue, the Court reached its own independent reading of the statute before
considering views that the Department of Labor had set forth in an opinion letter. When it did finally
consider the Department of Labor's views, the Court's entire application of Skidmore consisted of the
Court concluding in a single sentence that "we find unpersuasive the agency's interpretation of the statute at issue in this case." 1d. at 587.
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count only after the court reaches its own independent reading."' As one
'
commentator has explained, "[o]bviously this is not deference at all."255
Although "[d]eference is compatible with a court[] ultimately reaching a conclusion different from the agency's after weighing the agency's opinion," it
is incompatible "with reviewing the agency's interpretation only after the
court has already interpreted the statute,
256 and rejecting the agency opinion if
it does not coincide with the court's.
Judicial willingness to take this "we defer if we agree" approach may
be explained by the fact that Skidmore is seen as hinging on an expertise rationale. According to the expertise rationale, Skidmore calls for consideration to be given to non-binding agency views because agency views, even
though not controlling on the courts, may be based "upon more specialized
experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to
'
Viewing Skidmore solely through
come to a judge in a particular case."257
the lens of the expertise rationale, however, threatens to turn Skidmore into
a statement of the obvious: a judge should give weight to the views of expert observers with which the court agrees.258 If Skidmore is to have any
meaning-and if it is to have utility in terms of the interactive approach
proposed here-it has to mean more than merely that the courts should give
weight to agency views once a court independently reaches a result that
happens to coincide with the agency's own expert views.
Skidmore instead should be read as requiring courts to take agency
views into account as a relevant data point when independently construing
statutory ambiguity (and therefore forbidding courts from ignoring agency
views). 59 Moving Skidmore in this direction makes sense once one recognizes that Skidmore does not hinge entirely on the expertise rationale but
254 See Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004)
(noting only after the court reached its own construction that its construction accords with agency's informal views set forth in an advisory opinion); see also Womack, supra note 57, at 325-30 (discussing
examples of where the lower federal courts have deferred to agency views only where the agency views
happen to coincide with the court's own views).
255 John F. Coverdale, Chevron's Reduced Domain: JudicialReview of Treasury Regulations and

Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55 ADMIN. L. REv. 39, 58 (2003).
256 Id.; see also Cathedral Candle Co. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 400 F.3d 1352, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (noting that the Supreme Court could "not mean for [Skidmore] to reduce to the proposition that
'we defer if we agree"').
257 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
258 Cf United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 250 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Justice Jackson's eloquence notwithstanding, the rule of Skidmore deference is an empty truism and a trifling statement of the obvious: A judge should take into account the well-considered views of expert observers.").
259 See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 855 ("Skidmore is properly regarded as a deference
doctrine because the court cannot ignore the agency interpretation-the court must assess that interpreta-

tion against multiple factors and determine what weight they should be given."); see also Murphy, supra
note 3, at 46 (noting that because Skidmore views carry only "'persuasive' weight, a court is free to reject those with which it disagrees after fair consideration; but it is equally true that courts are not free to
ignore them").
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also rests on the notion that resolving ambiguities in statutes may turn on
competing policy choices.26 ° When a statute's clear meaning cannot be resolved by resorting to statutory text, legislative history, or other tools of
statutory construction, certain policy choices necessarily come into play.
Where an agency has been given policymaking powers by Congress but has
yet to exercise its delegated powers to resolve a particular question, it
makes especially good sense for the courts to take the relevant agency's
views into account as a pertinent data point when making a decision about
how to resolve the statutory ambiguity.26 ' If the court fails to do so, then the
court may merely postpone application of the agency's legitimate views
since the agency possesses congressionally-delegated power to override the
court's construction.262
Viewing Skidmore in this way-such that federal courts would be required to take agency views into account pursuant to Skidmore-finds support in two other analogous contexts where policymaking is at play: (1) the
federal courts' treatment of lower state court decisions in the federalism
context; and (2) agency treatment of public comments received during
rulemaking proceedings.
1.

The Federalism Analogy: Giving Weight to Non-Binding Lower
State Court Decisions in the Erie Context.-First, Skidmore's
meaning can be refocused by drawing on the federalism analogy. After
Erie emerged, the federal courts were faced with developing rules for handling ambiguous questions of state law that had not been definitively resolved by the state's highest court. Where a lower state court but not the
state's highest court had weighed in on an issue of indeterminate state law,
the federal courts grappled with what type of weight to give to such lower
court decisions. The rule that ultimately emerged is one that requires the
federal courts to take any lower state court rulings into account when deciding an unresolved question of state law but does not mandate that the fed260

In Skidmore itself, for example, the Court concluded that some weight should be given to the

views of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division because the Administrator had been given
the task of setting policy to guide enforcement actions. 323 U.S. at 139-40; see also Murphy, supra
note 3, at 43 (asserting that the "Skidmore construction process frequently requires courts to engage in
policymaking of the sort Chevron reserves for agencies" because courts must frequently resolve the
meaning of ambiguous statutory text); Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial
Deference to Agency InterpretationsAfter EEOC v. ARAMCO, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 187 (1992) ("When,
in a statute to be implemented by an agency, Congress creates an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by
the text, the legislative history, or the 'traditional tools of statutory construction,' the resolution of that
ambiguity necessarily involves policy judgment.").
261 See Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir. 1999) (taking the fact that the
agency had been delegated authority to administer the act into account when determining how much
weight was owed to the agency's informal interpretation under Skidmore).
262 Cf Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(explaining that broad deference is given to an agency's construction of its own regulations because "the
agency has the authority to amend the regulation itself" and thus "a court's refusal to defer may simply
postpone application of the agency's legitimate view").

1043

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

eral courts follow lower state court rulings.

In other words, a federal

court must consider a lower state court ruling as relevant to the question of
how the state's highest court would decide the issue, but the federal court
need not necessarily follow the lower state court ruling. In addition, regardless of whether the federal court ultimately chooses to accept or to reject
any relevant state court264rulings, the federal court generally will explain its

reasoning for doing so.

Such an approach could prove useful in the administrative law context
in terms of shedding light on how Skidmore might be given additional definition. Much like how the views of lower state courts do not necessarily
bind the federal courts in the Erie context, agency interpretations that fall
outside of Chevron's rule of mandatory deference do not bind the federal

courts in the administrative law context.265 Yet simply because an agency's
views are non-binding does not mean that a court should feel free to cast the
agency's views aside without even so much as considering them. Rather,
just as federal courts must at least consider the views of lower state courts
in the Erie context, Skidmore should be read to require the federal courts to
consider any relevant agency views when interpreting ambiguity in agency263

See, e.g., Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (stating that

"federal authority may not be bound even by an intermediate state appellate court ruling"); West v. Am.
Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237 (1940) (stating that a decision by an intermediate appellate state
court should not be "disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that
the highest court of the state would decide otherwise"); Craven v. Univ. of Colo. Hosp. Auth., 260 F.3d
1260, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoted in Aspen Orthopaedics & Sports Medicine, LLC v. Aspen Valley
Hosp. Dist., 353 F.3d 832, 840 n.5 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotes omitted) ("While not binding on this
court, decisions by a state's intermediate appellate courts provide evidence of how the state's highest
court would rule on the issue, and we can consider them as such.")); McGeshick v. Choucair, 9 F.3d
1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that, "[w]e are obliged to consider the holdings of state appellate
courts" but are not bound to follow such rulings "if we have good reasons for diverging from those decisions"); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Ger-beck Mach. Co., 806 F.2d 1207, 1209 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating
that intermediate appellate court decisions must be given "significant weight"); McKenna v. Ortho
Pharm. Corp., 622 F.2d 657, 662 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that, in ascertaining state law, federal courts
should give "proper regard" but not "conclusive effect" to decisions of lower state courts); Hayfield v.
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 436, 444 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("Lower state court decisions are
persuasive, but not binding, on the federal court's authority; if the State's highest court has not spoken
on a particular issue, the 'federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving
'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State."' (quoting Smith v. Whitmore, 270 F.2d
741, 745 (3d Cir. 1959))).
264 See Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 805, 814 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.)
("Even when a state's intermediate appellate courts are uniform,... we are not bound by them. But we
do need, in such a case, a reason for predicting that the state's supreme court will reject the intermediate
decisions.") (citations omitted); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Triangle Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th
Cir. 1992) (providing reasons for rejecting lower state courts' views); Williams, McCarthy, Kinley,
Rudy & Picha v. Nw. Nat'l Ins. Group, 750 F.2d 619, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining why court did
not accept views of Illinois' intermediate appellate court); cf Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S.
225, 232-33 (1991) (explaining that although appellate courts review a federal court's determination of
state law de novo, "an appropriately respectful application of de novo review should encourage a district
court to explicate with care the basis for its legal conclusions").
265 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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administered statutes. After considering an agency's views, the court could
decide-pursuant to Skidmore's multi-factor test-that the agency's views
are entitled to significant weight, to some weight, or alternatively that they
should be rejected completely.266 The court, however, would be required to
explain its treatment of the agency's views and thus could not ignore the
agency's views entirely.
Viewing Skidmore in this way would carry a significant advantage: the
federal courts could no longer render Skidmore a dead letter by "deferring"
to an agency's views only where the agency's views happen to coincide
with the court's own views.267 Of course, requiring courts to give due consideration to non-binding agency views will not guarantee that a court ultimately will accept an agency's preferred interpretation, but it should
increase the odds that the court will reach a conclusion in line with the
agency's views and thus should minimize the likelihood of agency override
or agency nonacquiescence. In addition, by requiring courts to both consider agency views and to explain why the agency's views were or were not
accepted by the court,268 the significant leeway that the lower courts currently exercise when applying Skidmore should be easier to keep in
check.269
2.

The "HardLook" Analogy: Giving Weight to Public Comments
Solicited During the Rulemaking Process.-In addition to the federalism analogy, support for framing Skidmore in a way that requires federal courts to take agency views into account also can be found by drawing
on a well-established administrative law rule: that agencies cannot ignore
public comments provided during a rulemaking's notice-and-comment pe266 United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (noting that deference under Skidmore can

range "from great respect on one end ... to near indifference at the other") (citations omitted).
267 As one commentator has explained,
[i]t appears that many courts are now viewing Skidmore deference as a hollow doctrine that requires little respect from the courts. Skidmore deference has become no deference, with courts
undertaking a de novo review of agency action once it has found Chevron inapplicable after the
Mead inquiry. If after this de novo review the court finds that its interpretation is consistent with
the agency's interpretation, then it grants deference. But "deference" is an inappropriate description of such an action. Instead, the court's decision to uphold the agency's interpretation should be
characterized as a coincidence.
Womack, supra note 57, at 330.
268 Requiring district courts to explain either in writing or orally on the record the basis for their
decisions is not unheard of in other contexts. See, e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 50 ("Whenever a district court resolves
any claim or counterclaim on the merits, terminates the litigation in its court ... or enters an interlocutory order that may be appealed to the courts of appeals, the judge shall give his or her reasons, either
orally on the record or by written statement."); FED. R. APP. P. 9(a)(1) ("The district court must state in
writing, or orally on the record, the reasons for an order regarding the release or detention of a defendant
in a criminal case."),
269 Cf Merrill & Hickman, supra note 7, at 862 (noting that the discretionary nature of the Skidmore
inquiry makes it "more difficult for the Supreme Court to rein in the courts of appeals, if they (or some
of them) exhibit a tendency to interfere unduly with agency policymaking through aggressive statutory
interpretation").
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riod but rather must both consider and respond to public comments.2 70 Pursuant to this rule, when an administrative agency receives public comments
during a notice-and-comment period, the administrative agency need not respond to every single public comment regardless of its significance. 271 The
agency, however, "must 'respond in a reasoned manner to the comments received, to explain how the agency resolved any significant problems raised
by the comments, and to show how that resolution led the agency to the ultimate rule.' 2 72 This rule not only ensures that public comments will factor
into an agency's policymaking process but it also ensures that reviewing
courts will have a basis for determining whether the agency took a "hard
look" at relevant considerations and exercised its discretion based on reasoned decisionmaking 73
Subjecting courts to a similar rule-and using "hard look" review to
shed light on the judiciary's own policymaking role-makes considerable
sense. 274 Such a rule would not mean that the courts would be obligated to
ultimately accept an agency's informal views (just as agencies are not required to ultimately accept public comments filed with them). Rather, it
would ensure that the federal courts cannot ignore agency views when making policy choices that Congress has chosen to place in the hands of an
agency. In other words, the federal courts would be required to take a "hard
look" at any relevant agency views (using Skidmore's factors) and to explain why the agency's views are or are not persuasive. 75
270 See RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.4, at 443-44 (4th ed. 2002)

(discussing requirement that agencies respond to comments received during rulemaking process); see
also Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 869 F.2d 1526, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[l]f
the agency had ignored the comments it received ... then it could not claim to have complied with the
APA's notice and comment requirements.").
271 Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that "comments must be significant enough to step over a threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of
agency response or consideration becomes of concern").
272 Action on Smoking and Health v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 699 F.2d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(quoting Rodway v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
273 The "hard look" doctrine derives from Motor Vehicles ManufacturingAss
"nv. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). In that case, the Court explained that
[n]ormally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.
Id.
274 I am grateful to Tom Merrill for pointing this analogy out to me.
275 At least one commentator has argued that "hard look" review should be used to shed light on
Skidmore. See Rossi, supra note 54, at 1143-46. According to Rossi, Skidmore's various factors can be
viewed as analogous to those that courts consider in applying "hard look" review because Skidmore's
factors enable the courts to analyze whether an agency has considered relevant factors in formulating its
policy determinations. Id. at 1143. In contrast to Rossi, I am not using "hard look" review to shed light
on what factors an agency must consider in interpreting statutory ambiguity. Rather, I am suggesting
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Consider, for example, the application of this proposed reading of
Skidmore in the context of an amicus brief filed by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Although the EPA's amicus views would not
bind the court pursuant to Chevron, the court nonetheless would not be free
to toss the agency's amicus brief aside without first giving the amicus brief
due consideration pursuant to Skidmore's factors-just as the EPA would
not be free to toss aside comments filed by an environmental group in the
context of a notice-and-comment rulemaking without first giving the comments consideration.
Not only would such a rule give teeth to Skidmore's discretionary deference doctrine, but it would bring greater uniformity to the ad hoc approaches to Skidmore used by the federal courts.276 In addition, such a rule
would better reflect the notion that providing meaning to statutory ambiguity often involves competing policy choices-policy choices that agencies
may be better suited to make than courts.
V. CONSIDERING OBJECTIONS TO AN INTERACTIVE MODEL

Because the courts currently tend to view interpretive authority as resting either with the courts or with the administering agency but not with
both, the suggestion that courts move toward a more "interactive" or
"shared" interpretive approach is open to opposition on several grounds.
Four possible objections to the suggested interactive approach are considered here. This article concludes that none of these objections are fatal and
that it would be beneficial to encourage courts and agencies to interact with
each other in the wake of Brand X.
A. Should Concerns About Avoiding Agency Override Play a Role in the
InterpretiveProcess?
A primary objection that could be levied against the interactive model
is that concerns about avoiding agency override and interbranch friction
should play no role in the judiciary's approach to statutory interpretation.
The argument would proceed as follows: Courts frequently engage in statutory interpretation despite the fact that judicial constructions can be overridden by Congress.277
Courts, therefore, should not change their
interpretive approach (nor should they shy away from imposing their own
that by analogizing to "hard look" review, it is possible to shed light on what factors the courts should
consider in interpreting statutory ambiguity.
276 See Womack, supra note 57, at 341 (noting that the Supreme Court "has decided to leave a question fundamental to the functioning of the administrative state in the hands of lower court judges who
may come to hundreds of different decisions on a sliding scale of Skidmore deference"); see also Merrill
& Hickman, supranote 7, at 862.
277 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 557 (2005) (noting that
Congress had enacted legislation to overrule one of the Court's prior judicial decisions); 111.Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) (quoted in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 711-12 (1995)
("'[]n the area of statutory construction[]' ... Congress is free to change [the] Court's interpretation.")).
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independent readings on agency-administered statutes) simply because
Brand X holds that a judicial construction of a statute can be overridden by
an agency.
This objection suffers from several flaws. First, as a purely factual
matter, the central assumption underlying this objection-that courts do not
alter their interpretive approach to avoid congressional overrides-rests on
shaky ground. Various commentators have concluded that the Supreme
Court does in fact take current congressional preferences into account when
deciding cases.2" William Eskridge, for example, has argued that one reason why Congress overrides Supreme Court decisions relatively infrequently is because "[t]he Court is attentive to current congressional (and...
'
presidential) preferences when it interprets statutes."279
In addition, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight have concluded that the "justices more than occasionally attend to the preferences/likely actions of other government actors. 28 °
One way that the Court may become aware of the views of members of
Congress is through amicus curiae briefs filed with the Court.28 ' Indeed,
since October Term 1977, members of Congress have filed amicus briefs
with the Court every single Term.282 Although it is unclear how successful
members of Congress are when attempting to influence the Court's decisionmaking process through amicus briefs, the Justices do occasionally cite
congressional amicus briefs in their decisions.2 3 Thus, far from deciding
cases in a vacuum, the Court may consider congressional preferences to be
a relevant factor.
Second, in terms of the normative objection that concerns about avoiding interbranch friction should play no role in the judiciary's approach to
statutory interpretation in the administrative realm, it is important to note
that courts construing ambiguous regulatory statutes generally are not performing traditional statutory construction. Rather, where a statutory term
truly lacks clear meaning and is susceptible to multiple plausible readings,
courts construing the statute in the absence of an authoritative agency opinion essentially must engage in policymaking to select one preferred reading
278 See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR at 119 (1997) ("The predominant
view [among scholars who have researched strategic behavior by the Supreme Court] is that justices
regularly take the other branches into account when they set the Court's doctrine on statutory issues,
voting strategically to minimize the chances that their decisions will be overridden."); see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 149-50 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 378, 390-97 (1991).
279 Eskridge, supra note 278, at 378.
280 EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 278, at 149-50.
281 See J. SCOURFIELD

MCLAUCHLAN,

CONGRESSIONAL

PARTICIPATION

AS AMICUS

CURIAE

BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 79-138 (2005) (describing the types of cases in which members of
Congress choose to file amicus briefs with the U.S. Supreme Court).
282 See id. at 27.
283 See id. at 167-71 ("Congressional briefs were cited by the Justices in approximately one in ten
cases in which Members filed amicus briefs.").
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over another. This quasi-legislative act arguably is better performed by
agencies that-unlike the courts-possess the expertise and the tools to engage in policymaking and that can be held politically accountable for their
policy decisions. 84 Thus, a more interactive approach that encourages
courts to seek out agency views on questions of statutory ambiguity would
not only help to reduce the likelihood of interbranch conflict between courts
and agencies but it also would help to reduce judicial policymaking and to
enable courts to draw on agency expertise, thereby increasing the quality of
judicial decisions.
B. Would an InteractiveApproach Muddle the Law of Deference or Lead
to Manipulation?
A second objection that could be leveled against the suggested interactive model is that Chevron, Christensen and Mead already have significantly muddled the law of deference by creating a dichotomy between
Chevron and Skidmore that the lower courts find exceedingly difficult to
apply and that they sometimes manipulate to serve their own means.285
Thus, if yet another interpretive approach is thrown into the mix, perhaps it
will only further confuse matters.286
This objection ignores the nature of the interactive approach proposed
here. I do not propose that an entirely new type of deference be added to
the judiciary's vocabulary on top of Chevron and Skidmore. Rather, I suggest that when courts are faced with construing a statute in the absence of a
binding agency interpretation, it makes sense to encourage the courts to solicit agency views and to require the courts to give those agency views due
consideration. As Brand X itself demonstrates, statutory interpretation in
the regulatory realm can no longer be viewed through an "either-or" lens
whereby either the relevant agency possesses the power to interpret the
statute or the courts retain that power.28 7 Now statutory interpretation must
be viewed as a shared enterprise: the courts may possess the power to define an ambiguous statutory term initially while the relevant agency retains
284 Cf Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (arguing that
courts should certify questions of statutory ambiguity to Congress because "[flederal judges, valued for
their independence from politics and public opinion, have neither the expertise nor the authority to engage in the kind of substantive lawmaking that is required when they must apply a statute containing
significant gaps").
285 See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction, Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347, 361

(2003) (referring to Mead as a "failed experiment" and arguing that the decision has led to confusion in
the D.C. Circuit); Wildermuth, supra note 57, at 1888-99 (describing uncertainty that Mead has created); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1457-64 (2005); Womack, supra note 57, at 322.
286 Cf Vermeule, supra note 285, at 357 ("Judges can operate in a mode of deference, and in a
mode of independent decision-making, but more refined, intermediate modes are either psychologically
unattainable or nonexistent.").
287 See supra Part II.C.
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the ultimate power to adopt a different interpretation later on. Encouraging
courts to recognize their reduced role in the interpretive process in light of
Brand Xby soliciting and considering agency views should not further confuse matters but rather should help courts to act in a way that reflects the
proper relationships between courts and agencies in resolving conflicting
statutory policies.
Of course, this all assumes that judges will voluntarily demonstrate a
willingness to cede some of their interpretive powers to agencies postBrand X-an assumption that remains open to question. In the federalism
context, the federal courts have shown a general willingness to certify questions to state courts,"' which suggests that the federal courts might demonstrate a similar willingness in the administrative law context post-BrandX.
However, judges-especially judges concerned with maximizing their own
policymaking powers-could instead refuse to view statutory interpretation
as a shared enterprise post-BrandX and could choose to act strategically to
try to keep the task of statutory interpretation within their domain. A court
interpreting an ambiguous statutory provision for the first time, for example, might choose to invite the relevant agency's views only where the court
thinks that the agency's views will match the court's own personal policy
preferences. Or the court might take care to label its statutory interpretation
as grounded in the "clear" text of the statute so as to lock its interpretation
into place and to give the judicial precedent stare decisis effect. In turn,
appellate courts reviewing statutory interpretations that they dislike could
proclaim the statutory provisions to be "ambiguous"-thereby enabling the
reviewing court to defer to agency interpretations that the court finds preferable.
Although this type of gaming certainly is a possibility post-BrandX, 89
it not only would be unseemly but it would thwart Congress's decision to
delegate regulatory policymaking to agencies rather than the courts. A far
more attractive alternative would be for courts-taking a cue from Brand
X-to willingly recognize that statutory interpretation no longer can be seen
as a purely judicial exercise and to move toward a more interactive approach that accepts agencies' central role in the interpretive process. If the
lower courts are unwilling to take this step on their own, then perhaps a
288 See GOLDSCHMIDT, supra note 137, at 28 (reporting that the federal courts of appeals certified
192 questions, or 70% of all certification applications, from 1990 to 1994); see also id at 43 (reporting
that 54% of federal circuit judges surveyed indicated that they were "willing" or "very willing" to certify
questions to state supreme courts).
289 How much judging is driven by politics rather than "principled practice" is open to question.

See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decisionmakingon the D.C. Circuit,84 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1337
(1998). Some scholars, however, have concluded that politics drive courts' application of Chevron.
See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, JudicialPartisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2168-73 (1998) (reporting results suggesting that "there is a significant political determinant to judicial decisionmaking, at least in
Chevron review").
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clear signal or two from the Supreme Court indicating that the lower courts
should start thinking creatively about using agencies as the primary interpreters of statutory ambiguity will prod the lower courts to cede some of
their interpretive power to agencies post-BrandX.
C. Would an InteractiveApproach Minimize Agency Incentives to Engage
in Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking Procedures?
Yet another criticism that could be raised against an interactive approach is that it would encourage agency gaming by minimizing incentives
to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking. Notice-and-comment rulemaking frequently forces agencies to expend significant sums and to spend
years mired in the rulemaking process.29 ° Thus, if agencies know that courts
will solicit and consider their views prior to construing ambiguity in an
agency-administered statute, will agencies have less incentive to engage in
costly and time consuming notice-and-comment rulemaking in the first
place?291
Certainly, agencies may have less of an incentive to engage in noticeand-comment rulemaking in light of Brand X.292 This is because agencies
now know that even if they elect not to engage in notice-and-comment
rulemaking to resolve an issue of statutory ambiguity, they will not be foreclosed from doing so in the future.293 Although the interactive approach
proposed here might increase the risk of agency gaming to some extent, it
should not significantly aggravate what Brand X already has done in terms
of creating incentives for agencies to hold off on engaging in notice-andcomment rulemaking. Even if a court were to follow an interactive approach and to seek out an agency's views, there is no guarantee the court ultimately would accept the agency's views. Rather, any solicited agency
views set forth in non-binding formats, such as agency amicus briefs,
merely would receive the court's consideration pursuant to Skidmoreleaving open the possibility that the court might choose to reject the
agency's views. In this sense, the interactive approach proposed here
should not give agencies much more of an incentive to hold off on noticeand-comment rulemaking than does the very existence of Skidmore deference itself: Skidmore's presence already offers agencies the option of earn290 See generally Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387-90 (1992).
291 Cf Bamberger, supra note 20, at 1310 (arguing that widespread use of the primary jurisdiction

doctrine would "create perverse incentives for agency inaction" because the "agency would not need to
make a considered judgment on statutory construction during the normal course of policymaking to ensure that it would prevail in any particular case; it always would be given the chance to reach a defer-

ence-deserving interpretation before litigation was concluded").
292 See Chevron Deference, supra note 103, at 403-04.
293 See id. at 403 ("Because agencies will no longer be bound by prior judicial constructions of stat-

utes, they have fewer reasons to engage in notice-and-comment procedures during the initial interpretation of a statute.").
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ing some deference even if the agency chooses to forego issuing a binding
interpretation, such as a notice-and-comment rule.
In addition, in deciding whether to sit back and await a court's invitation before offering up its views, the agency also will have to consider the
possibility that courts may in some cases decide that it would be inappropriate or impractical to invite agency views. Nor would there be any guarantee that unresolved statutory ambiguity would reach the courts and be
decided in a timeframe desired by the agency. Thus, agencies would have
to decide whether to (1) engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking at the
outset, or (2) wait for a court to face an issue and to invite the agency to
provide its informal views. Although the first route (the notice-andcomment route) would force agencies to expend considerable time and
money at the outset, the alternative route (the informal route) would not be
free of its own attendant costs. Rather, in considering whether to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking and to take the informal route, the relevant
agency would have to consider the costs it would face if its informal views
were rejected by the courts-forcing the agency to expend considerable resources promulgating (and later defending) a Chevron-eligible interpretation to overcome the courts' interpretation.9
In short, although some agencies may choose to refrain from engaging
in notice-and-comment rulemaking if they know that courts will solicit
agency views before interpreting statutory ambiguity on their own, the risk
of this type of strategic gaming is offset to some extent by the costs that
agencies may face if they delay notice-and-comment rulemaking. Furthermore, the benefits of enabling courts to seek out agency views and to rely
on agency expertise rather than engaging in judicial policymaking are substantial and arguably outweigh the risk that some agencies may engage in
strategic gaming.
D. Would an InteractiveApproach Represent an Abdication of the Courts'
Role in the InterpretiveProcess?
A final criticism that could be levied against the interactive approach
deserves consideration: rather than promoting dialogue between courts and
agencies, perhaps the interactive approach proposed here actually would
have the effect of cutting off the courts' contributions to the interpretive
process and thus would not result in any meaningful "interaction" at all.295
294 This could be costly to the agency because it might force the agency to participate in two separate proceedings. Cf id. at 404 & n. 65 ("The inclination of agencies to promulgate interpretative rules
under Brand X will be partially offset by the cost of having to litigate the interpretation in two separate
proceedings-once under Skidmore deference and once under Chevron deference. Thus, agencies may
often conclude that the potential cost of having to litigate twice outweighs the burdens of notice-andcomment procedures.").
295 Cf Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decisions: A Study in
Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 900-02 (1985) (arguing that a true "interactive" model of
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Given that Congress has empowered agencies to set regulatory policy
through rulemaking and enforcement efforts but also has empowered the
courts to interpret regulatory statutes in the context of private litigation,2 96 is
it appropriate to cut courts out of the interpretive process by essentially favoring agency views? Would Congress want courts to duck unresolved issues of statutory ambiguity in order to allow the relevant agency to act?
Analogous questions have been raised in the federalism context where
some commentators have argued that state and federal courts actually may
benefit from "intersystemic cross-pollination 297 and that certification and
abstention-rather than promoting interaction-actually tend to undermine
this intersystemic interaction by cutting federal courts out of the interpretive
process.298 In addition, some commentators, such as Martin Redish, have
argued that judge-made abstention doctrines used in the federalism context
actually constitute "a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle of separation of powers" because they enable the courts
to effectively ignore Congress's decision to give the federal courts jurisdiction over cases raising state law questions.299
Such concerns, however, do not carry much force in the administrative
law context. First, with respect to separation of powers concerns, Chevron
compels courts to accept reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutory provisions precisely because Congress has commanded that the
courts do so.3"' Given Chevron's premise that Congress intends agencies
rather than courts to act as the authoritative interpreters of ambiguous statutory provisions,3"' it is difficult to see how a court would thwart congresfederalism occurs when federal and state courts engage in an interactive dialogue with the other court
system about the proper shaping of the other system's laws).
296 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
297 Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of JudicialBusiness Between State and Federal
Courts: FederalJurisdictionand "The Martian Chronicles," 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1773 (1992); cf
Redish, supranote 295, at 901 (arguing that both state and federal systems "have much to gain from institution of a dialogue between the courts of both systems").
298 See Friedman, supra note 233, at 1239 & n.69 ("Despite a general preference for resolving novel
state law questions in state court, commentators occasionally express a competing interest in the 'crossfertilization' or 'cross-pollenization' of state law by federal judges."); see also David L. Shapiro, Federal DiversityJurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal,91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 325-26 (1977) (surveying
various federal appellate court decisions and concluding that federal courts often make "useful contributions to developing state law" by "reconciling or distinguishing existing precedent" and "synthesizing
and analyzing state law").
299 Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers. and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94
YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984).
300 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
301 Chevron itself involved review of an agency rulemaking proceeding-not private litigation between two private parties initially brought in federal court. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 841 (1984). Nonetheless, courts generally have assumed that Chevron applies in the private litigation context as well. See, e.g., Wash. State Dep't of Soc. and Health Servs. v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003) (granting Chevron deference to agency regulations
in the context of a class action suit brought by children in foster care against state); Phillips Co. v. Den-
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sional intent if the court were to leave the task of law declaration up to the
relevant agency. Put another way, the delegation rationale underpinning
Chevron seems to alleviate concerns that the courts-by inviting agencies
to assist with the task of law declaration-would somehow thwart congressional intent or violate notions of separation of powers." 2
Second, there is little reason to worry that the interactive approach
proposed here would completely cut off useful dialogue between federal
courts and agencies about the meaning of ambiguous regulatory provisions
and turn federal courts into "ventriloquists' dummies""3 3 for agencies. As
discussed above,3 °4 absent a Chevron-eligible interpretation from the relevant agency, courts following the interactive approach would not be forced
to function as passive receptacles for whatever views the relevant agency
might feed to them. Rather, if a court utilized the interactive approach proposed here to solicit an agency's non-binding views, such as agency views
set forth in an amicus curiae brief, then the court ultimately would remain
free to reject the agency's views and to impose its own judicial interpretation pursuant to Skidmore after giving the agency's views due consideration.3 °5 The Courts, therefore, still could engage in useful dialogue with the
relevant agency and could potentially help to shape the agency's future
views.
CONCLUSION

The Court's recent decision in Brand X resolved the simmering conflict between stare decisis and Chevron, making clear that a court's own independent construction of statutory ambiguity will not freeze the meaning
of a statute into place. BrandX, accordingly, created a solution to the "ossification" problem posed by Mead. In creating this solution, however, the
Court's decision raised new questions about the proper allocation of interpretive authority between agencies and courts. In particular, because Brand
ver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 1375, 1377 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Chevron deference in a
suit to quiet title between private parties); cf Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (considering a claim to Chevron deference in the context of a suit between a county and employees of the
county sheriff department but ultimately finding Chevron inapplicable because the agency had not acted
with the "force of law"); Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 882 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) (noting that in private litigation, Chevron gives force to an agency interpretation accompanied "by the formalities of rulemaking or administrative adjudication").
302 Along these lines, it is important to note that if a court were to follow my proposed interactive
approach and to invoke the primary jurisdiction doctrine or request an agency amicus curiae brief postBrand X, the litigants would not be deprived of a judicial forum entirely. Rather, the federal court
would still engage in law application and fact finding-asking the relevant agency to help only with the
task of law declaration (a task that Congress has delegated to the agency rather than to the courts).
303 Richardson v. Comm'n of Internal Revenue, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (responding to
charge that Erie turned the federal courts into the "ventriloquist's dummy to the courts of some particular state").
304 See supra Part IV.B.
305 See supra Part IV.B.
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X announces that a court's independent construction of statutory ambiguity
may merely serve as an interim construction, the Court's decision raises
questions about whether the courts can and should minimize those situations where they independently resolve statutory ambiguity prior to the
relevant agency weighing in on the issue.
The interactive approach proposed here, which draws on the interactive
approach that emerged in the federalism context post-Erie, suggests a way
that courts could cut back on those situations where a court will construe a
statute one way only to have the relevant agency turn around and impose a
contrary interpretation. Use of an interactive approach promises to further
efficiency and uniformity in the law and to minimize the frequency of confrontational games between agencies and courts. In addition, an interactive
approach would enable the courts to capitalize on agency expertise and to
minimize judicial policymaking. Ultimately, however, the success of an interactive approach will rest in the hands of courts and agencies. Taking a
cue from Brand X's reallocation of interpretive power, courts must become
willing to cede some of their interpretive power to agencies, and agencies
must demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with the courts by responding
to judicial invitations for assistance.
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